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ABSTRACT 
Dwight S. Mears: Interned or Imprisoned?: The Successes and Failures of International 
Law in the Treatment of American Internees in Switzerland, 1943-45 
(Under the direction of Wayne E. Lee) 
 
During World War II, over 100,000 soldiers of various nationalities sought refuge 
in neutral Switzerland, including over 1,500 American airmen from damaged U.S. 
bombers.  As a result of the U.S. violations of Swiss neutrality and other external factors, 
the Swiss government was unwilling to apply the 1929 Geneva Convention prisoner of 
war protections to the U.S. airmen when they were punished for attempting escape.  The 
politicization of internment procedures resulted in a diplomatic stalemate in which the 
ambivalence of Swiss officials prolonged mistreatment of U.S. airmen in violation of 
emerging customary international law.  I believe that answering the question of how 
international law functioned in the scenario of Swiss internment will demonstrate both 
the cultural importance of Swiss adherence to international law, as well as the process by 
which states frequently interpret ambiguous international law to their advantage. 
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Introduction 
 The questionable actions of many governments during international conflicts in 
the twentieth century underscores the difficulty of creating and enforcing rules for 
wartime conduct.  Not only is the international law of armed conflict difficult to enforce, 
but the evolutionary nature of the law lags behind the infinite possibilities of combat, and 
loopholes in the law are often addressed only after they have been exploited.  Warfare 
generates new permutations of combatants and technology that are not codified clearly 
under existing international law.  The process of interpreting this gray area illustrates how 
governments behave in response to treaties, as well how individuals and governments can 
take advantage of the inherent ambiguity of international law.   
In World War II, over 1,500 American airmen were interned by neutral 
Switzerland, the vast majority being U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) aircrews from 
damaged B-17 and B-24 bombers.  As required by the Hague Convention of 1907, “a 
neutral Power which receives on its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies 
shall intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war.”1  Many of 
these internees were treated well, but others who unsuccessfully attempted escape were 
punished well beyond the limits of emerging international law through imprisonment in 
punitive confinement camps.  The Swiss refusal to afford military internees the legal 
protections of Prisoners of War (POWs) was a questionable decision under emerging 
                                                 
1 Art. 11, The 1907 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and 
Persons in Case of War on Land (The Hague: 18 October 1907), available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/INTRO?OpenView.   
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international law.  This paper will explore the diplomacy surrounding the internment of 
American airmen in Switzerland in 1944 in order to determine how the Swiss negotiated 
emerging international law on prisoner treatment, and what this means in the larger 
context of other states adhering to international law. 
The internment of American airmen in Switzerland during World War II began 
with a B-24 Liberator bomber nicknamed “Death Dealer.”  A high-altitude heavy bomber 
with a crew of ten, four engines, and a bomb load of six tons, the B-24 was a critical part 
of the Allied strategic bombing campaign in Europe.2  Death Dealer was assigned to the 
9th Air Force in North Africa, and was considered a lucky ship after surviving the 
infamous August 1, 1943 raid on the oil refinement facilities in Ploesti, Romania, known 
as Operation Tidal Wave.  Of 177 aircraft on the mission 53 were lost and 55 damaged.3  
In that raid, highly accurate anti-aircraft fire ripped through Death Dealer’s fuselage, 
disabling two of its engines and mortally wounding one of the machine gunners on the 
crew, Sgt. Paul Daugherty.  Despite a gaping wound in his chest, Sgt. Daugherty lived 
long enough to ask his pilot “Will you say a prayer for me?”  The pilot did, just before 
Daugherty died in his arms.4  
Less than two weeks later, early in the morning of August 13, 1943, Death Dealer 
went airborne from its base in North Africa and maneuvered into tactical formation with 
113 of its sister ships.  Its mission was to fly over the Alps and drop its high explosive 
payload on the Messerschmitt fighter aircraft factories in Wiener-Neustadt, Austria.  As it 
                                                 
2 “Battle Log of the Liberators,” Popular Mechanics, (Sep. 1943), p. 28-9. 
 
3 See Jay A. Stout, Fortress Ploesti: The Campaign to Destroy Hitler's Oil Supply (Havertown: Casemate 
Publishers, 2003), 76, and James Dugan and Carroll Stewart, Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 
August 1943 (New York: Random House, 1962), 222. 
 
4 Dugan, Ploesti, 216. 
      3 
did for huge numbers of strategic bombers during the war, Death Dealer’s luck finally ran 
out.  One of the aircraft’s engines sputtered to a halt enroute to the target, and another 
engine was violently shot out by anti-aircraft fire while over the Messerschmitt factory.  
The pilot, USAAF Lt. Alva Geron, struggled in vain to maintain altitude with only two 
engines.  He knew that the smoking aircraft was in trouble.  After deciding that he could 
not return to base in North Africa, Geron requested a heading to neutral Switzerland from 
his navigator.  Soon Death Dealer passed over a large lake at the northern foot of the 
Alps, which the navigator correctly identified as the border on the Rhine between 
Germany and Switzerland.  The ground already loomed too close for the crew to 
parachute from the crippled bomber, so Geron prepared for a crash-landing.  Spotting an 
open field, Geron lowered the wheels as the remainder of the crew braced for impact.  
The aircraft touched down and shook violently as it lumbered to a halt, plowing its nose 
into the earth as its forward landing gear collapsed.  Improbably, the entire crew 
survived.  Uncertain whether he was in enemy territory, Geron ordered the crew to burn 
the aircraft to prevent its capture by a foreign government.  As the crew set off explosive 
charges, curious onlookers approached the bomber amid the drone of air raid sirens.  In 
fact Death Dealer had landed in Wil, a small village in the canton of St. Gallen in western 
Switzerland.  The navigator had accurately guided the doomed Death Dealer into a 
neutral country, and one can only imagine that the crew felt a palpable sense of relief at 
having avoided capture by the Germans.  Even neutral internment had its price, however.  
The lieutenant and his crew were soon arrested by uniformed Swiss soldiers and escorted 
to Zurich for interrogation and quarantine.5  Whether killed or captured by an enemy or 
                                                 
5 Stephen Tanner, Refuge from the Reich: American Airmen and Switzerland during World War II 
(Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 2000), 79-80.  Internees were only one segment of the military refugees 
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neutral, only about one in four B-17 or B-24 bomber crews in 1943 completed the 
required 25 missions to finish a combat tour.6  Death Dealer's crew would be the first of 
many to end up in Switzerland, and they would test the limits of that country's 
commitment to neutrality and the rule of international law. 
Historians have examined aspects of Switzerland’s neutrality and role in the war 
since the war ended.  Initial perceptions of Swiss wartime policies were largely 
nationalistic and celebrated the Swiss spirit of resistance.  This attitude was exemplified 
by the works produced by the works of Hans Rudolf Kurz, the official historian of the 
Swiss Federal Military Department.7  The first debates over the Swiss actions during the 
war emerged in the early 1960s, and focused on the collaboration between Swiss 
government officials and the Nazis.8  In 1962, the Swiss government commissioned a 
study of Swiss wartime neutrality, the Bonjour Report, which dealt primarily with the 
impact of military decisions on foreign policy.9  Given the heavily restricted archive 
access to World War II records, the Bonjour Report “monopolized” Swiss history of the 
war until the revision of the Federal Archive Regulation in 1973.  This step eased 
restrictions on archive records, and in one historian’s view, “created the necessary 
                                                                                                                                                 
in Switzerland; those who evaded capture and entered on foot, as well as those who escaped from 
belligerent prisoner of war camps were not interned but rather offered asylum. 
 
6 Steward H. Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: The Myths and the Facts 
(Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2003), 9.  The required number of missions to complete a tour 
rose by the end of the war. 
 
7 See Rudolf Juan, “The Military National Defence, 1939-45,” in Switzerland and the Second World War, 
ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 197, and Hans Rudolf Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten 
Weltkrieg: das grosse Erinnerungswerk an die Aktivdienstzeit 1939-45 (Thun: Ott Verlag, 1959). 
 
8 See Alice Meyer, Anpassung oder Widerstand.  Die Schweiz zur Zeit des deutschen Nationalsozialismus 
(Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 1965). 
 
9 Juan, “The Military National Defence, 1939-45,” 198. 
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conditions for the evolution of an independent historiography of Switzerland’s role in the 
Second World War.”10   
A debate over the Swiss Army’s role in the war emerged in 1974, following the 
publication of Max Frisch’s Dienstbüchlein (Service Booklet).11  In this work, the 
popular story of the Swiss Army’s defensive National Réduit strategy as a deterrent to 
German invasion was portrayed as a myth,12 which eventually gave rise to the suggestion 
that Switzerland retained its autonomy because of its willingness to collaborate 
economically with the Nazis.13  The importance of these economic ties was confirmed in 
1985 by Werner Rings’ Raubgold aus Deutschland (Looted Gold from Germany), which 
linked Switzerland’s independence to its financial relationship with Germany.14  In 1989, 
the issue again entered the public sphere with Markus Heiniger’s Dreizehn Gründe: 
Warum die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg nich erobert wurde (Thirteen Reasons why 
Switzerland was not Conquered), which addressed the financial, strategic, and political 
benefits that Swiss neutrality provided to Berlin.15 
                                                 
10 Sacha Zala, “Governmental Malaise with History: From the White Paper to the Bonjour Report,” in 
Switzerland and the Second World War, ed. Georg Kreis (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 328-9. 
 
11 Max Frisch, Dienstbüchlein (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenburch, 1974). 
 
12 Kreis, ed., Switzerland and the Second World War, 5. 
 
13 The National Réduit strategy would apply during an invasion, and entailed surrendering indefensible 
parts of the country and moving the bulk of the Swiss Army into alpine fortresses that controlled key roads.  
See Hugh R. Wilson, Switzerland: Neutrality as a Foreign Policy (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 
1974), 11-12. 
 
14 See Kreis, Switzerland and the Second World War, 3-4, and Werner Rings, Raubgold aus Deutschland : 
die "Golddrehscheibe" Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Muenchen: Artemis, 1985). 
 
15 See Neville Wylie, Review: “‘Life Between the Volcanoes,’ Switzerland during the Second World War,” 
The Historical Journal, vol. 38 (Sep. 1995), 760, and Markus Heiniger, Dreizehn Gründe: Warum die 
Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg nich erobert wurde (Zurich: Limmat Verlag, 1989). 
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Although historians had already uncovered much of Switzerland’s controversial 
wartime actions prior to the 1990s, the debate remained largely in academic circles until 
the release of the U.S. government’s “Eizenstat Report” in 1997.  The Eizenstat Report 
bluntly accused Switzerland of using neutrality as “a pretext for avoiding moral 
considerations,” and of prolonging the war by financing the Axis.16  The Swiss were 
labelled as sharing culpability for the Holocaust as a result of receiving “tainted” gold 
looted from Holocaust victims.  Private citizens targeted the Swiss banking system for 
retribution, and a boycott of Swiss banking in New York City was threatened.17  The 
Eizenstat Report also triggered an outpouring of polemics defending Switzerland's 
conduct in the Second World War.  Amid this furor, the Swiss government sought to 
influence the debate by commissioning an Independent Committee of Experts (ICE) to 
render an impartial verdict on wartime collaboration.  The ICE found that, outside of 
scholarly circles, “hardly any critical questions were posed regarding the past,” which 
resulted in an “idealised collective memory” of the war.18 
The historiography of Swiss military internment of American airmen was 
originally a part of the Swiss grand narrative that emphasized the accomplishments of 
Swiss humanitarian efforts during the war.  In the 1970s, one author incorrectly related 
that American airmen in Switzerland “had a splendid time, except when they suffered 
                                                 
16 “Major Conclusions and Policy Implications,” in U.S. and Allied Efforts to Recover and  
Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany During World War II (U.S. Dept. of State, 
1997), available at: http://fcit.usf.edu/Holocaust/resource/gold/GoldMenu.htm.  See also Hans Senn, 
“Defending Switzerland: The Impact of Armed Neutrality in World War II,” in Switzerland Under Siege, 
1939-1945: A Neutral Nation’s Struggle for Survival, ed. Leo Schelbert (Rockport: Picton Press, 2000), 15.   
 
17 Angelo M. Codevilla, Between the Alps and a Hard Place: Switzerland in World War II and Moral 
Blackmail Today (Washington D.C.: Regnery, 2000), x. 
 
18 Independent Commission of Experts (ICE) Switzerland – Second World War, Switzerland, National 
Socialism and the Second World War (Zürich: Pendo, 2002), 497. 
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from boredom and homesickness.”19  The subject remained overshadowed by the issues 
of Swiss civilian refugee and financial policies during the war until the 1990s, when the 
release of archival records permitted a more thorough investigation.  Swiss historian 
Peter Kamber’s Schüsse auf die Befreier (1993) was the first in-depth study of the 
American internee experience.  Kamber described a de facto war between Swiss air 
defenses and Allied airplanes as well as mistreatment of interned Allied aviators in 
punishment camps.20  He also questioned the legality of internment policies and criticized 
the denial of POW protections to internees.21  Kamber’s work was followed by Olivier 
Grivat’s Internés en Suisse (1995), another Swiss history which placed the internment of 
American airmen in the context of all interned nationalities.  Grivat drew similar 
conclusions about the internment of Americans and blamed poor oversight of Swiss 
Army officials in charge of internment camps.22   
In the 2000s, the first U.S. authors published works that dealt exclusively with 
American internees in Switzerland, such as Stephen Tanner’s Refuge from the Reich 
(2000) and Cathryn Prince’s Shot from the Sky (2003).23  Both works concentrated on the 
oral history of American internees, including combat experiences, internment, and escape 
or repatriation.  Prince accused Swiss government officials of denying American 
internees the protections of international law, but stopped short of analyzing the military 
                                                 
19 Heinz K. Meier, Friendship under Stress: U.S.-Swiss Relations 1900-1950 (Bern: Herbert Lang & Co, 
1970), 299. 
 
20 See Peter Kamber, Schüsse auf die Befreier: Die "Luftguerilla" der Schweiz gegen die Alliierten 1943-45 
(Zurich: Rotpunktverlag, 1993). 
 
21 Ibid., 221. 
 
22 Olivier Grivat, Internés en Suisse 1939-1945 (Chapelle-sur-Moudon: Editions Ketty & Alexandre, 1995). 
 
23 See Stephen Tanner, Refuge from the Reich: American Airmen and Switzerland during World War II 
(Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 2000), and Cathryn J. Prince, Shot from the Sky: American POWs in 
Switzerland (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2003). 
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tribunals of American airmen or other legal implications of internment.  American 
internees of Switzerland are also mentioned in several works about the larger air battle 
for Europe, but the scope of these works afforded little room for protracted discussion of 
the internment experience.24  The polarization of the Swiss literature in the wake of the 
Eizenstat Report has influenced some portrayals of American internees in Switzerland: 
Stephen Halbrook’s Target Switzerland (1998) cites only effusive statements about Swiss 
internment from two American internees, in what could only be described as a 
mischaracterization.25   
Thus several American and Swiss authors have mentioned the questionable 
internment policies of the Swiss government, but none fully contextualize the problem 
within the malleability of developing customary international law.  Most works on the 
larger debate over Swiss wartime conduct mention Swiss military internment only in the 
aggregate, and therefore American internees are subordinated to the superior numbers of 
many other interned nationalities.26  This study will significantly rewrite this story 
through a more thorough analysis of sources in the U.S. and Swiss Archives, 
complicating the current understanding of Swiss actions during the war by including 
perspectives of both internees and their captors.  Furthermore, I demonstrate that the Axis 
and Allies concurrently asserted pressure on the Swiss, both in terms of internment and 
                                                 
24 See Rob Morris, Untold Valor: Forgotten Stories of American Bomber Crews over Europe in World War 
II (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc, 2006), and Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America's 
Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006). 
 
25 See Stephen P. Halbrook, Target Switzerland : Swiss Armed Neutrality in World War II (Rockville 
Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1998), 203. 
 
26 American military internees numbered only 1,516 airmen, while approximately 104,000 military 
refugees were interned over the course of the war.  See Prince, Shot from the Sky, 24, and Independent 
Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era (Bern: 
ICE, 1999), 21. 
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other wartime concerns.  Perhaps most crucially, I also add an extensive framework of 
legal analysis that has yet to appear in any accounts of Swiss internment.   
Of particular use in understanding how Switzerland navigated its way between the 
competing pressures of diplomacy, military threat, and international law is a 
consideration of how law functions in a society.  A substantial and growing body of work 
on law and culture informs the analysis presented here.  The field was pioneered by 
nineteenth century anthropologists with legal training such as Lewis Morgan and Henry 
Maine.  By the early twentieth century, the ethnographic fieldwork of Bronislaw 
Malinowski shifted the discipline from a focus on jurisprudence to all forms of disputes 
and social control.  In the 1950s, scholars such as Max Gluckman and Victor Turner 
founded the processual approach, or the study of law “as process rather than as rules and 
outcomes.”  The most influential scholar of this field is Laura Nader, whose book The 
Disputing Process: Law in Ten Societies (1978) studied different types of dispute 
settlement in various cultures.27  As expressed by Lawrence Rosen, law is a “cultural 
domain” which can help to “understand how a culture is put together and operates.”28  
Although this field rarely focuses on disputes over international law, my analysis of the 
legal policies of Swiss internment nevertheless examines a similar “push and pull of 
contestation” during cultural negotiations over how the law is interpreted and what it 
means.29  By presenting the internment of Americans in Switzerland as a case study, I 
hope to demonstrate what the rule of international law meant to Swiss officials, how 
                                                 
27 Dorothey H. Bracey, Exploring Law and Culture (Long Grove IL: Waveland Press, 2006), 13-16. 
 
28 Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 4-5. 
 
29 Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, “The Cultural Lives of Law,” in Law in the Domains of Culture 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 8-9. 
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contestation over the law influenced decisions well below the architects of legal policy, 
and how similar exploitation of the law can occur in contemporary conflicts.   
Swiss Neutrality 
The precedent for internment of belligerent aircraft and their crews was 
established well prior to the arrival of Death Dealer in Switzerland.  International law 
defined the obligations of neutral Switzerland to intern belligerents.  Neutrality, defined 
by T.J. Lawrence in 1925 as “the condition of those states which in time of war take no 
part in the contest, but continue pacific intercourse with the belligerents,” has a particular 
meaning when discussed in the context of Swiss history.30  Switzerland pioneered much 
of the contemporary international law governing neutrality, making the practice one of 
the defining characteristics of the Swiss state. 
Switzerland’s neutrality during World War II was the continuation of a policy of 
longstanding or “perpetual neutrality” that had its roots prior to Switzerland’s existence 
as a federated state.  Switzerland began in the fourteenth century as a defensive alliance, 
called the Eidgenossenschaft or Swiss Confederation.31  The Swiss Confederation 
adopted the policy of neutrality after its loss to the French at the Battle of Marignano, 
near Milan, Italy in 1515.32  The defeat convinced the Swiss that their small 
confederation was best suited for defensive wars, a decision that was reinforced by the 
reality that the Swiss were a culturally heterogeneous population with a decentralized 
                                                 
30 Thomas J. Lawrence, A Handbook of Public International Law (London: Percy H. Winfield, 1925), 149.  
 
31 James M. Luck, A History of Switzerland: The First 100,000 Years: Before the Beginnings to the Days of 
the Present (Palo Alto: Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship, 1985), 37. 
 
32 Max Habicht, “The Special Position of Switzerland in International Affairs,” International 
Affairs (October, 1953), 457, Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 8. 
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political system.33  Switzerland’s neutral position was further cemented by Allied 
guarantees of perpetual Swiss neutrality in 1815 after violations of Swiss territory 
occurred during the War of the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon.34  In addition, the Swiss 
Constitution of 1848 made Switzerland a federative state instead of a confederation, 
providing a central government and army that allowed the political declaration and 
enforcement of neutrality.35   
Swiss obligations as an “active neutral” include providing humanitarian assistance 
to belligerents, hosting international conferences on humanitarian law, and receiving both 
civilian and military wartime refugees.  These services all set Switzerland apart from 
other neutral states in global conflicts.36  The Swiss custom of interning foreign 
belligerents took several centuries to develop, as the policy entailed more than simply 
humanitarian concerns.  In the Evangelical Conference of 1644, the Swiss decided to 
deny asylum to foreign armies because of the danger that a pursuing army would follow 
the interned forces and fight them in Switzerland.37  In 1709, approximately 4,000 
Austrian cavalry troops trespassed on Swiss territory and highlighted the weaknesses of 
the existing policies governing Swiss responses to belligerents.  Despite engagement of 
the Austrians by Swiss forces, French General du Bourg accused the Swiss of aiding the 
                                                 
33 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 8. 
 
34 Georges André Chevallaz, The Challenge of Neutrality: Diplomacy and the Defense of Switzerland 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001), 2. 
 
35 Ibid., 3. 
 
36 Neville Wylie, Britain, Switzerland, and the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 96. 
 
37 Luck, A History of Switzerland, 214-5. 
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Austrian cavalry by allowing them to evade and fight another day.38  This jeopardized 
Swiss neutrality by appearing to provide a military advantage to one belligerent.  New 
policies were developed in reaction to this problem, namely disarmament and internment 
of belligerents to preclude their further use in a conflict.   
During the War of 1859, or the Second Italian War of Independence, the Swiss 
Federal Council issued instructions to the Swiss Army to disarm any belligerent troops 
“pushed on Swiss territory,” and intern them in “the interior of Switzerland.”  This decree 
was the first instance in history where a government stipulated requirements of a neutral 
country toward belligerent troops during international armed conflicts.  The decree was 
soon enforced when seven Italian soldiers crossed the Swiss border, soon followed by a 
contingent of 650 Austrian soldiers.  All parties were interned in castles and military 
barracks, and were released upon the conclusion of the conflict.39 
The Swiss government next resorted to internment of belligerents in 1871 during 
the Franco-Prussian War, when nearly 88,000 soldiers of the First French Army, known 
as the Bourbaki Army, crossed into Switzerland at Les Verrières and were disarmed and 
interned by the Swiss military.  The massive number of internees forced the Swiss to 
distribute the internees among 188 villages in nearly every canton, where internees were 
under the administration of local military authorities.40  The Federal Council gave the 
Swiss Army jurisdiction over internees who committed criminal offenses, including 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 288. 
 
39 Max Steiner, Die Internierung von Armeeangehörigen kriegfuhrender Machte in neutralen Staaten, 
insbesondere in der Schweiz während des Weltkrieges 1939/45 (Zürich: Ernst Lang, 1947), 15-18. 
 
40 See François Bugnion, “The Arrival of Bourbaki's Army at Les Verrières,” International Review of the 
Red Cross, no 311 (1996), available at: http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JN32, and 
Steiner, Die Internierung von Armeeangehörigen kriegfuhrender, 23. 
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escape attempts.  Internees who were caught outside their assigned districts were 
confined at the criminal garrison at Luziensteig.41 
Although the obligation for a neutral state to intern belligerents only existed under 
customary international law in 1871, the example of the internment of the Bourbaki 
Army directly influenced subsequent written law of armed conflict conventions.42  The 
1874 Conference of Brussels drafted articles listing the obligation of a neutral power to 
intern belligerents, in particular the requirement to intern soldiers “at a distance from the 
theatre of war,” the provision of basic humanitarian needs, and the possibility for 
wounded troops to be transported through neutral territory.  The Brussels Declaration 
also listed the requirement that “The Geneva Convention applies to sick and wounded 
interned in neutral territory,” which referenced the largely inadequate Geneva 
Convention of 1864.43  Although the Brussels Declaration was not ratified, the 1907 
Hague Convention (V) soon codified these requirements verbatim into treaty law.44  In 
addition, the Hague Convention added neutral responsibilities such the use of force to 
prevent belligerents from utilizing neutral territory and the equal application of trade 
restrictions to all belligerent powers.45   
The Swiss again interned soldiers of belligerent governments during World War I.  
The practice of neutrals interning aircraft of belligerent powers also developed during this 
                                                 
41 Steiner, Die Internierung von Armeeangehörigen kriegfuhrender, 23-24. 
 
42 Bugnion, “The Arrival of Bourbaki's Army at Les Verrières.” 
 
43 Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (Brussels: 27 August 
1874), available at: http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/135?OpenDocument. 
 
44 Bugnion, “The Arrival of Bourbaki's Army at Les Verrières.” 
 
45 See Articles 3, 9, and 11 of The 1907 Hague Convention (V). 
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conflict, and by the end of the war all neutral states unanimously adhered to the rule.46  
The right of a neutral state to prevent belligerents from violating its airspace is an 
extension of the right of territorial integrity.47  During this period, arguments were raised 
that the obligation to intern belligerent aircraft should not apply in cases of erroneous 
overflight, force majeure, or aircraft in distress.48  However, these cases were judged to 
be “too indefinite to differentiate from intentional entrance” by belligerent aircraft, and so 
neutral states adopted a strict interpretation of the obligation to intern.49  Among these 
neutrals were the Swiss, who forged many of their internment policies during World War 
I.  Although aviators made up a small minority of internees in Switzerland during World 
War I, at least three American pilots were interned.50  2nd Lt. James Ashenden crash-
landed his French Nieuport 28 fighter in Solothurn Canton on 24 June 1918 after his 
propeller was damaged by enemy fire.51  Another American aircrew was interned when a 
two-man airplane landed near Fahy, Switzerland on September 14, 1918.52 
The sovereignty of airspace was codified in international law after World War I in 
the Air Navigation Convention of October 13, 1919, and later appeared in the 1923 
                                                 
46 James M. Spaight, Air Power and War Rights (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1924), 421. 
 
47 Detlev F. Vagts, “Switzerland, International Law and World War II,” The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 91, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), 467. 
 
48 Force majeure means an act of God, or in context a course necessitated by the “stress of weather.”  See 
Daniel P. O'Connell and Ivan A. Shearer, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), 853. 
 
49 K. V. R. T., “Aerial Warfare and International Law,” Virginia Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Feb., 1942), 
519. 
 
50 Some sources list as few as 15 belligerent aircraft interned during World War I.  See Fiona Lombardi, 
The Swiss Air Power: Where From? Where To? (Zurich: Hochschulverlag, 2007), 27. 
 
51 See Jon Guttman and Harry Dempsey, USAS 1st Pursuit Group (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 6, 34, 
and Gorrell’s History of the American Expeditionary Forces Air Service, 1917-1919, NARA M990, Series 
M, Vol. 10. 
 
52 “Swiss Intern Two American Airmen,” New York Times, 15 September 1918. 
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Report of the Hague Commission of Jurists upon the Revision of the Rules of Warfare.53  
This set the stage for Swiss internment during World War II, a conflict in which 104,000 
military refugees were accepted into the small nation of only 4.2 million people.54  By the 
start of the war, the duty of a neutral to intern belligerent aircraft was well known among 
the general public, and even appeared in American media stories describing Swiss 
internment.  In a story published in the New York Times in May 1944, the newspaper 
listed “the international rules governing the internment of belligerent fliers who violate 
neutral territory,” and explained that “a neutral Government shall use the means at its 
disposal to intern any belligerent military aircraft which is within its jurisdiction after [the 
aircraft lands] for any reason whatsoever.”55 
Internment in World War II 
 The Swiss Army was responsible for supervision of interned soldiers during 
World War II.  At least 850,000 Swiss citizens served in the Swiss Army during the war, 
although not all of these troops were mobilized simultaneously.56  The vast majority of 
soldiers in the Swiss Army were reservists called to service because of the state of 
national emergency, and only a small percentage were professional soldiers.  The Swiss 
Army was based on a militia system of compulsory conscription, wherein able-bodied 
males underwent a short period of military training at the age of 20 and were then 
assigned to reserve divisions based on age and training until the age of 48, although in the 
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late 1930s the age limit was increased to 60 on account of the wartime emergency.57  The 
service of most officers was also compulsory; there were so few permanent positions in 
peacetime that the Swiss Army required any soldier to accept a commission or take a 
command as a contingency.58   
Even the Swiss Army’s top rank of four-star General was constitutionally limited 
to times of national emergency after an election by the Federal Assembly.59  This was a 
reflection not only of Switzerland’s defensive military posture, but also the reality of 
decentralized control of military affairs in which troops often resented leaders who were 
not from a canton of like cultural affiliation.60  In August 1939, the Swiss Federal 
Assembly promoted corps commander Henri Guisan to the rank of General and 
commander in chief in response to the expectation that French troops massing on the 
border would infringe Swiss neutrality.61  Guisan was only the fourth Swiss soldier in 
history to attain the rank, which he held for the remainder of the war.62  Guisan’s superior 
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was the minister of the Swiss Federal Military Department, a politician selected from the 
seven-person Federal Council.63 
In 1940, the Swiss Federal Military Department created a Federal Commissariat 
for Internment and Hospitalization (FCIH) to oversee the considerable task of supervising 
internees from the fighting between French and German forces.  On June 18, 1940, 
approximately 45,000 soldiers from the Forty-fifth French Corps sought refuge in 
Switzerland after facing encirclement by German panzer units, forcing the issue of 
centralized federal control over internment.64  The commissioner of the newly-created 
FCIH answered to the chief of the Swiss Army General Staff as per a decree of the Swiss 
Federal Council in December 1940.65  Command of the FCIH was passed from a major 
general to a lieutenant colonel in its first year of existence, and then subordinated as a 
section under the adjutant general of the Swiss Army in January 1942.66  In early 1943 
the adjutant general himself, Major General Ruggero Dollfus, was officially appointed as 
the FCIH commissioner, a post he held through late 1944.67  That Dollfus served 
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concurrently as the FCIH commissioner and the adjutant general during an unprecedented 
military mobilization testifies to the understaffed and overburdened Swiss officer corps.   
As FCIH commissioner, Dollfus ran an organization that consisted largely of 
conscripts and volunteers.  As reported by General Cartwright, the military attaché at the 
British Legation in Switzerland, senior Swiss Army officers often complained of “the 
poor type of officer serving in the Commissariat, who would not have been there if he 
had been capable of earning a decent living in civil life.”  According to the attaché, senior 
FCIH officers mistrusted their subordinates and were hesitant to delegate decisions to the 
camp level.68  This view of the FCIH was evidently shared by other Allied diplomats, 
such as those at the U.S. Legation.  Whether or not the FCIH was really this poorly 
administered, the internal friction in the organization did eventually hamper 
communication and impede inquiries into internment conditions.   
By February 1944, about 100 American airmen were interned in Switzerland 
under the supervision of the FCIH.  The first American internees were housed at the 
resort town of Adelboden, which the Swiss General Staff selected for its remote location 
and numerous hotels normally used to accommodate tourists in peacetime.69  The Swiss 
government eventually constructed 768 camps for foreign military and civilian refugees, 
although the Americans were generally segregated into their own camps as were most 
nationalities.70  The number of American internees in Switzerland spiked dramatically 
starting in the spring of 1944, as the increased tempo of the Allied strategic bombing 
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offensive sent American bombers farther into France and Germany in a coordinated 
attempt to destroy the German Luftwaffe prior to the Normandy landings.71  Sixteen 
damaged heavy bombers landed in Switzerland on a single day in March 1944, and the 
landings continued unabated through July, a month that saw the internment of forty-five 
U.S. warplanes with 404 airmen.   
The influx of new Americans prompted the Swiss to open a second camp at 
Davos in June 1944, followed by a third camp at Wengen in August 1944.72  A total of 
1,516 American airmen were interned in Switzerland during the war, although there were 
never this many held all at once due to repatriations and successful escapes.73  The 
number of interned Americans reached its apex in September 1944, with 1,179 airmen, 
and declined to 700 by December 1944 due to what the U.S. military attaché, Brigadier 
General Barnwell R. Legge, referred to as an “exodus” of “internees escaping from Swiss 
territory” via the French border.74  Once Allied forces reached the Swiss border in August 
1944, escape attempts increased dramatically as American internees aspired to rejoin 
friendly lines.75  At least 149 Americans who were caught attempting escape in 1944 
were sent to a special punishment camp at Wauwilermoos, where their confinement 
would eventually test the limits of international law.76 
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 In early December 1944, U.S. Army Air Force First Lieutenant Wally Northfelt 
was nearing his second month of imprisonment in the punishment camp at 
Wauwilermoos.  Nine months earlier as the navigator on a B-24 bomber based in 
England, he was shot down by German anti-aircraft fire while on a mission to bomb the 
Dornier Aircraft Factory in Friedrichshafen.  Since the target city was near the Swiss 
border, the pilot diverted the damaged plane to Switzerland and crash-landed at 
Dübendorf Airfield in Zurich.  Northfelt attempted to escape from Switzerland near 
Geneva in September 1944, but he was apprehended by border guards and confined at 
Wauwilermoos.  After his arrival at the punishment camp, Northfelt quickly tired of the 
meager rations of coffee, bread, and thin soup, which he blamed in part for his weight 
loss of forty pounds over the course of his time in Switzerland.  He professed that “I 
never did sit down to a meal where I was completely satisfied,” and claimed that he was 
only able to get enough food to survive by purchasing it off the black market.  Northfelt 
was also ill; sleeping on dirty straw had caused him to break out in sores all over his 
body, and he had problems with his prostate gland.  Appeals for medical care had 
resulted in a consultation with a doctor who, Northfelt claimed, “specialized in women’s 
cases” and was unqualified to help him.  Northfelt thought the doctor “knew about as 
much about medicine as I did,” judging by the fact that he “puttered around” and “wasn’t 
doing anything for me.”  Northfelt also disliked the camp administrators, who, he 
claimed, were “pro-Nazi,” and only cleaned up the camp when inspections by high 
ranking officers or American dignitaries were announced.  He resolved to make a formal 
complaint to U.S. authorities when, and if, he was released from Wauwilermoos.77 
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 Wauwilermoos was built in 1940 in Lucerne, Switzerland, about twenty-six miles 
south of the German border.  Run by the Swiss Army, the camp housed military internees 
of various nationalities, including Poles, Italians, French, English, Germans, Yugoslavs, 
Greeks, and Americans.78  Military-run prisons like Wauwilermoos were established 
earlier in the war, after cantonal prisons became overcrowded with prisoners convicted in 
military courts.  According to a decree of the Swiss Federal Council in 1941, military 
prisoners would be confined according to whether their offenses qualified them for 
“custodia honesta,” or honorable confinement.  Special military-run prisons would offer 
confinement for “certain offenses of purely military character,” since honorable crimes 
such as “escape and escape attempts . . . are usually not the crimes of common 
criminals.”79  Regardless of the intent of the Federal Council, for most of 1944 the FCIH 
did not follow the custodia honesta model, but rather grouped American internees with 
common criminals in Wauwilermoos. 
From 1941-1945, Wauwilermoos was under the command of Swiss Army Captain 
Andre Béguin, a politically controversial figure who shouldered much of the blame for 
the camp’s conditions.80  Born in the French-speaking canton of Neuchâtel, Béguin had 
obtained a commission as a Swiss artillery officer in 1928, but subsequently was 
discharged due to excessive personal debt.  In the 1930s he became active in politics and 
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joined the National Union in Geneva,81 an anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi political party 
which was a popular fascist movement in Switzerland during the period.82  According to 
a Zurich newspaper, Béguin was an avowed Nazi who signed his correspondence with 
“Heil Hitler.”83  In 1937, he was arrested for illegally wearing a pro-Nazi “party uniform” 
to a political rally in Yverdon, Switzerland.84  Around the same time, Béguin was also 
forced to resign from the National Union after he embezzled party funds.85  Despite his 
tarnished record, he obtained work in 1940 as a civilian employee of the FCIH, a job 
translating artillery manuals that led to a second commission in the Swiss Army in as an 
ordinance officer.86  This ill-advised appointment was almost certainly due to the national 
state of emergency and manpower shortage in the Swiss Army, although this does not 
explain the decision to place Béguin in charge of soldiers of other nationalities.  In July 
1941, Béguin was given command of Wauwilermoos, a post he held until August 1945.87   
In his position as camp commandant, Béguin had no sympathy for the Americans 
under his charge; his correspondence reveals that he found American internees to be 
undisciplined and ungrateful, claiming that they were “too spoiled by their stay in hotels 
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in the mountains and do not understand purely military treatment.”  Béguin also looked 
down on the Americans because of their common background as airmen, claiming that 
due to their brief military education “they are specialists, but not soldiers.”  To support 
this view, he argued that “They do not know of barracks life, nor that of soldier 
campaigning; they are uniformed workers and technicians who service aircraft.”   In 
Béguin’s view, this lack of professional military education produced an absence of 
“elementary courtesy and politeness,” resulting in an “atmosphere … as painful for us as 
it is for them.”88 
In response to the complaints of American internees, Béguin professed that the 
discomfort experienced at Wauwilermoos was due to overcrowding; the officer barracks 
were designed for only 20 occupants, but had 86 by the fall of 1944.  As a result, he 
explained that he could no longer provide amenities such as sheets and shaving mirrors 
for officers below the rank of captain.  Firewood to heat the barracks stoves was also in 
short supply.  In response to the Americans “who [threatened to cut] up tables and 
benches to keep warm,” Béguin claimed surprise at “the attitudes of those who wished to 
burn all the furniture,” and resolved that “if they behaved churlishly we could no longer 
treat them like officers.”  He claimed that the allocation of firewood was greater than the 
quantity rationed to Swiss soldiers, a comparison used to justify many conditions around 
the camp.  Béguin also stressed that the barracks were built according to regulations, and 
despite their shortcomings, were “of the same type as those used in the Army.”  He 
bluntly professed that “Yielding [to American pressure] would be a sign of weakness,” 
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and attributed American complaints to internees who “do not understand the special 
functions of our military justice system, which includes slowness.”89 
Officials at the U.S. Legation in Switzerland disagreed with Béguin’s tempered 
description of conditions at Wauwilermoos.  According to General Legge, the camp was 
“of the stockade type,” and the barracks were “surrounded by barbed wire, constantly 
patrolled by dogs and guards with sub-machine guns.”  Conditions were “unreasonably 
severe,” with internees sleeping on loose straw, food “at the lowest subsistence level,” 
and mud “ankle deep.”  General Legge labeled these conditions “disgracefully bad” and 
considered them worse than those in German POW camps.  Prior to the escape attempts 
of the summer of 1944 the Swiss sent only a few American internees to Wauwilermoos, 
normally for “drunkenness and disorderly conduct” and with the tacit approval of the 
U.S. legation.  Once the escape attempts began in earnest, the Swiss government sent 
every offender to Wauwilermoos, normally for two or three months without trial.  By the 
fall of 1944, over 100 American internees were incarcerated in Wauwilermoos, and the 
Swiss government threatened to keep them there without trial for six to seven months.90  
Many of the American internees in Wauwilermoos were eventually charged in the Swiss 
military justice system, an experience that forever changed their perceptions of Swiss 
neutrality. 
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A Day in Court 
The majority of Americans held in Wauwilermoos in the fall of 1944 were in 
pretrial confinement, awaiting a military tribunal by the Swiss Army for the crime of 
attempting escape.  The tribunals were convened by territorial courts, whose jurisdiction 
was established by decree of the Federal Council in 1939.91  Operating under the Swiss 
Military Court Regulations of 1889 and the Swiss Military Penal Code of 1927, the 
tribunal panels consisted of a mix of six officers and noncommissioned officers under a 
judge, or “chief justice.”  The panel members and judge were elected by the Federal 
Council for three-year terms and retained their regular military positions while serving 
the court.  The judge was not required to be trained in law despite his position as 
“chairman of the court,” although the Military Court Regulations specified that he must 
“at least hold a major degree.”  Also present at tribunals were a prosecutor, defense 
attorney, court clerk, and in the case of foreign defendants, a translator.92   
The authority to try military internees was written into the original Military Penal 
Code, which meant that the intent to apply internal Swiss law to internees predated World 
War II.93  Internees on trial for escape normally faced charges for “disregard of 
regulations,” an article of the Military Penal Code that allowed punishment of up to six 
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months of penal servitude or imprisonment in times of war.94  However, the Military 
Penal Code did not specify a minimum sentence and even permitted the downgrade of the 
offense to disciplinary punishment in “mild cases.”95  This subjectivity gave military 
tribunals wide latitude to treat escape attempts as minor infractions, or instead classify 
them as criminal felonies.   
Once a tribunal convened, the burden of proof was normally substantiated by 
escape reports from internment camp commanders, arrest reports from local police, and 
interrogations conducted after the internees were recaptured.96  Assembling this evidence 
was the responsibility of an official investigator, who was appointed to the court for a 
three-year term.97  This preliminary investigation was a laborious process of cataloging 
all of the relevant paperwork, and did not facilitate the swift execution of justice.  Adding 
to this burden was the fact that many internees traveled across Switzerland before their 
apprehension, which required the investigator to obtain depositions from diverse 
locations.  The Swiss military justice system was quickly overwhelmed by the rash of 
escape attempts in the summer of 1944.  From 1944 to 1945, at least 183 Americans were 
charged by military tribunal, but only about 55 of these men ever received verdicts due to 
the combination of the time it took to complete a trial and the large number of internees 
that were repatriated or successfully fled the jurisdiction in the interim.  For the minority 
of indicted internees who eventually received verdicts, the average sentence was 74 days 
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in prison, but the average time to complete the investigations and military tribunals was 
82 days, underscoring the American criticisms of the Swiss military justice system.98  
Sgt. Dale Ellington, a young gunner on a B-17 bomber based in England, was 
bombing an aircraft factory near Munich in April 1944 when his airplane was shot down 
by German anti-aircraft fire in April 1944.  The airplane was shot at again by Swiss 
fighters and anti-aircraft batteries after crossing the Swiss border and then landed in 
Dübendorf, Switzerland, with no less than 35 shell and bullet holes in its fuselage.  
Miraculously, the aircraft made it to Switzerland despite severe damage to a fuel cell, 
severed control cables, one engine out, and only 40 minutes of fuel remaining.  Interned 
in Adelboden, Switzerland, Ellington remained in his internment camp until September, 
when he heard that American forces were approaching the Swiss border with France.  On 
September 17, 1944, Ellington slipped out of Adelboden and used his passable German to 
purchase train tickets for himself and three other internees.  Dressed in civilian clothes, 
the group managed to travel unaccosted to a city near France, only to be questioned and 
arrested by an observant Swiss soldier on a bicycle only miles from the French border.  
The Americans were first confined in the Basel city jail for three days and then 
transferred to Wauwilermoos, where Ellington recalled “barbed wire, straw bunks, and 
guard dogs.”  After nearly a month in Wauwilermoos, Ellington and his fellow would-be-
escapees were transported to Bern to appear at the arraignment for their military 
tribunal.99   
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At the arraignment each defendant was given a copy of the poorly translated 
charges, in fact the only trial record they received.  The document was titled “Act of 
Accusation,” and methodically listed the identities of the defendants, the charges against 
them, a catalog of evidence, and the names of their tribunal jurors.  The internees faced 
the charge of disregard of regulations, listed on a translated indictment as “non-
compliance of the rules of service.”  The evidence on the indictment was listed as 
“documents of [preliminary] examination,” and “production of the four defendants.”  The 
defendants were brought in front of the tribunal panel, which consisted of three Swiss 
officers and three enlisted soldiers, the highest ranking of which were two captains.100  
The panel jurors were permitted to question the defendants to determine the validity of 
the charges, part of the normal arraignment process.101  During this interrogation, a Swiss 
captain on the jury panel asked the Americans why they had traveled so far from their 
camp at Adelboden.  In response, one of the airmen defiantly informed the juror that “We 
were chasing butterflies.”  According to Ellington, this lack of candor was not well-
received; the officer was “obviously vexed by the remark,” and immediately responded: 
“You have served thirty days at the detention camp and you will now return there and 
serve forty five more!”  The captain was good to his word; Ellington was returned to 
Wauwilermoos until 1 December.102    
The verdict for Ellington’s tribunal was not delivered for another twenty days, by 
a slightly altered panel in which one of the Swiss captains had been replaced by another 
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officer of the same rank.  The verdict was 75 days confinement for all four defendants, 
with 45 days deducted for pretrial confinement.  In addition, the defendants were 
assessed their pro-rated share of the trial cost, 17.5 Swiss Francs.103  The defendants were 
not present for the verdict, as a personal appearance was only required during the 
arraignment phase of the tribunal.104  According to the Military Court Regulations, a 
defendant “has a right to be present only when the trial takes place at the place where he 
is in custody,” and trials were not conducted at Wauwilermoos.105  Ellington was 
unaware that the tribunal continued after his departure, and was never informed of the 
actual verdict.  He believed that the statement made by the Swiss officer at his 
arraignment was the reading of his sentence, when in fact it was probably a rebuke for 
being in contempt of court.106  Ellington’s confusion at his arraignment demonstrates that 
internees had difficulty comprehending their experience with Swiss military justice due 
to both language and cultural differences, and the fact that they were effectively serving 
their sentences in advance of the tribunal verdicts. 
Another veteran of the Swiss military justice system was Tech. Sgt. Daniel Culler.  
A turret gunner on a B-24 bomber, Culler’s airplane was shot down by German anti-
aircraft fire while bombing Friedrichshafen on March 18, 1944.107  Less than two months 
after his arrival in Switzerland, Culler attempted to escape from Adelboden along with 
his former crewmember Staff Sgt. Howard Melson and a British soldier, Matthew 
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Thirlaway, a former POW who had escaped from an Italian POW camp.108  The trio had 
planned to escape over the Italian border at Bellinzona and seek refuge with a family that 
had previously sheltered Thirlaway during his initial escape from captivity.  The group 
successfully made the journey to Bellinzona by train, but then became lost in the 
mountains.  After eating poisonous berries and becoming ill, Culler turned back and 
made the return trip to Adelboden.  From here he was placed in solitary confinement in a 
local jail for twelve days, and then returned to Adelboden under house arrest.  The local 
Swiss military commander informed him that he would now be sent to a federal prison 
and was “no longer a military prisoner, but was now classified as a civilian prisoner.”109 
Culler was transferred to Wauwilermoos in June 1944, where he was in fact a 
military prisoner in a military-run penitentiary.110  However, in his grouping with soldiers 
of various nationalities who had committed various crimes, Culler did not receive the 
legal protections or rights that a military prisoner would normally expect.  Very few 
Americans were confined in Wauwilermoos until August 1944, and as a result Culler 
only briefly saw one other soldier who might have been an American during his first 
month in the compound.  Forced to bunk with Russian prisoners, Culler was repeatedly 
raped and assaulted by fellow inmates, but his complaints to the guards and camp 
commandant went unheeded.  Eventually Culler developed open boils all over his body 
and contracted tuberculosis, which went untreated for a considerable time.  After a month 
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in Wauwilermoos, Culler was informed that he would be leaving the compound not for 
medical treatment, but for his military tribunal arraignment in Baden.111 
Culler was tried along with his fellow would-be-escapees, who were recaptured 
by Swiss border guards during the ill-fated escape attempt.  Culler was unaware that his 
former crewmember, Sgt. Howard Melson, and the British soldier, Matthew Thirlaway, 
had both been imprisoned in civilian jails and then confined in Wauwilermoos in a 
different barracks.  Melson had made an additional attempt to escape from 
Wauwilermoos in June, and was apprehended and jailed in the district prison at Bern.  
Culler and Melson were both charged with disregard of regulations for leaving 
Adelboden without permission.  Thirlaway was not charged with this article of the 
Military Penal Code because as an escapee he was in a different legal category than the 
military internees, and thus subject to different regulations.  All three defendants were 
charged with disobeying general orders, in this case traveling across Switzerland without 
permission with the intent to cross the border.  This article of the Military Penal Code 
targeted infractions that contravened “publicly advertised regulations or general orders” 
from the Federal government, Swiss Army command, or cantonal governments, and 
authorized punitive measures from disciplinary punishment to prison time.  In this case, 
the infraction violated the Swiss Federal Council Resolution of September 25, 1942 
regarding the partial closure of the border.112 
Culler’s appearance at his military tribunal arraignment was preceded by a 
meeting with his defense attorney, a well-dressed man named Max Brand who spoke 
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English.  Although not in uniform, the fact that the courtroom guards came to attention 
and saluted Brand gave Culler the distinct impression that he was a Swiss officer.  Brand 
produced a message that Culler had previously passed to a British soldier in 
Wauwilermoos describing his severe treatment, in the hope that it would make its way to 
the US Legation.  Brand informed Culler that the message had been passed to the Swiss 
Embassy, and would now be used as evidence against him at trial.  Culler attempted to 
tell Brand about the severe treatment he had experienced at Wauwilermoos, but the 
attorney “wouldn’t listen to any of my complaints,” and “kept harping on that message I 
illegally sent to the British Embassy.”  In the process of his conversation with Brand, 
Culler became excited and “began to cough up blood and other sickening fluids into a 
wastebasket by the table.”  This was the extent of the contact that Culler had with his 
attorney, who subsequently “moved even farther away from me—probably not wanting 
to catch what he thought I had.”113 
When brought in front of the tribunal panel with his codefendants, Culler was 
surprised by “a person who was seated front and center before the judges’ bench” who 
stood and recited a brief family history of each of the accused in English, including 
parents’ names and home addresses.  Presumably, this was the court clerk or translator.  
The recitation of family history unsettled Culler, who wondered exactly how the Swiss 
had obtained information that he had never offered to them.  The remainder of the 
tribunal hearing was conducted in German, and since Culler’s lawyer never spoke to him 
in English during the proceedings, he therefore had very little understanding of what 
transpired.  He recalled that “Many times all six judges and my defender were looking me 
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up and down while they talked, and several leaned over the bench to get a better look at 
me.  Several times, as he spoke, my defender would make [gestures] towards me and 
everyone had big smiles on their faces.”  At the end of the hearing, the same person who 
had given Culler’s family history approached him and read from a paper: “The judges 
took into account that you are a very young soldier who took too seriously the orders to 
escape that came from your commanders in England . . . If you had been older and wiser, 
like most of the others in the internment camp, you would have realized escape was 
impossible.  There is nowhere to go, even for those lucky enough to cross the border.”  
Culler was given a translated copy of his indictment which, like Ellington’s, only listed 
the defendants, charges, and jurors.  Confused, he wondered why “the accusation papers 
never mentioned how long we would be sentenced for, or how long we had already 
served.”  Culler inquired about his verdict and the length of his sentence, and was told 
that he would be informed after returning to Wauwilermoos.  He then became agitated, 
yelling: “You mean you’re sending me back to that hellhole, Wauwilermoos?”  This 
finally elicited a response from his defender in English: “Yes!”114 
Although unknown to him at the time, Culler’s only court appearance was merely 
the arraignment for his military tribunal, and the tribunal would not produce a verdict 
until the following week under a different set of judges in Bern.  As with Ellington, 
Culler also misunderstood the function of the arraignment process due to language and 
cultural barriers.  Culler was later convicted of disregard of regulations, and received a 
sentence of 90 days imprisonment with 52 days deducted for pretrial confinement.  His 
codefendant, Sgt. Howard Melson, was also convicted of disregard of regulations, and 
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received a stiffer penalty of 105 days imprisonment.115  The increase in his sentence 
relative to Culler’s was almost certainly due to Melson’s second escape attempt, as well 
as the fact that Culler had voluntarily returned to his camp in Adelboden.   
Although the tribunal judges may have legitimately believed that they were 
exercising leniency in Culler’s case, any chance at gratitude was lost between the 
prospect of further incarceration at Wauwilermoos and the lack of transparency during 
the tribunal proceedings.  Culler claimed that during his trial he “felt much resentment 
coming from the judges, my defender, and the Swiss military establishment.”  Perhaps 
this perception was a misunderstanding, but it was a foreseeable consequence of a 
prosecution conducted in a foreign language.  The process produced a lifelong critic of 
the Swiss notions of justice and adherence to the rule of law.  In Culler’s opinion, his day 
in court “was nothing more than a mock trial, so the Swiss could clear the records—just 
in case someone, sometime, might question my sentencing and treatment without a court 
trial.”116   
Matthew Thirlaway was the sole defendant convicted of disobedience of general 
orders, and was sentenced to the 40 days he had already spent in prison; “ausgestandene 
Untersuchungshaft,” or time served.117  Despite the fact that Thirlaway committed 
roughly the same offenses as Culler and Melson, he was treated more leniently by the 
court because of his status as an escaped POW, which afforded him different rights than 
internees.  According to the 1907 Hague Convention (V), “a neutral Power which 
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receives escaped prisoners of war shall leave them at liberty,”118 which meant that 
Switzerland had less legal standing to regulate Thirlaway’s movements and restrict him 
to a camp.  The court therefore determined that he had not committed an offense under 
military law, and instead treated him “as a civilian, regardless of his status as an escaped 
prisoner of war.” Although originally charged with the same disobedience of general 
orders as Thirlaway, Culler and Melson were not convicted of this crime.  Ostensibly, the 
tribunal determined that convicting them of both disregard of regulations and 
disobedience of general orders would amount to illegally punishing them twice for 
elements of the same underlying offense of attempted escape.119   
By the end of October 1944, both Culler and Melson had successfully escaped 
from Switzerland.  However, Ellington and his codefendants were still incarcerated at 
Wauwilermoos.  They were among only about five Americans in confinement who had 
received verdicts from their military tribunals, which left at least 95 other American 
prisoners in legal limbo at the camp.120  Although U.S. officials were concerned about the 
Swiss military’s version of pretrial confinement and their methodical timetable for 
dispensing justice, they also contested the Swiss interpretation of international law that 
allowed prosecution of internees under the Swiss Military Penal Code.  In the view of the 
U.S. Legation, the Swiss military justice system circumvented the protections of 
international law and produced open-ended verdicts that were disproportional to the 
crime of escape, an antithetical practice for a neutral state that claimed to hold the rule of 
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law in high regard.  This disagreement instigated a diplomatic crisis between U.S. and 
Swiss officials over the scope and intent of international law. 
The Debate over International Law 
The debate that emerged over the application of international law to American 
internees was also a debate over Swiss neutrality, as the creation and enforcement of this 
law was interwoven with the principles of neutrality that ensured Switzerland’s 
reputation as an exceptional state perpetually devoted to peace and humanitarian 
principles.  According to Hans Kohn, “The Swiss national idea is not based upon race or 
biological factors, it rests on a spiritual decision.”121  However, many Swiss still 
identified strongly with their ethnic and cultural roots.  With this in mind, the ideological 
model of the Swiss state, termed “civic exceptionalism” by some scholars, was necessary 
to overcome the ethnic and cultural plurality that might otherwise override Swiss 
nationalism.  During World War II, Swiss civic exceptionalism was strongly tied to the 
enforcement of humanitarian law, since this mandate represented “the voluntary 
commitment to a set of values and institutions” that distinguished Switzerland from other 
countries in Europe.122  Within this context, the decision by Swiss officials to limit the 
application of international law would not have been taken lightly, as it could potentially 
challenge the very basis of Swiss neutrality and statehood.   
In embracing its mandate as the guardian of international law during World War 
II, Switzerland accepted a considerable responsibility as the designated “protecting 
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power” between thirty-five different belligerents.123  This designation entailed acting as a 
proxy for a state that had severed diplomatic relations with its enemy, in order to 
“safeguard the [state’s] interests and its nationals in relation to a third State.”124  Among 
its 219 wartime mandates, the Swiss represented U.S. interests in twelve separate enemy 
countries, including Germany, Italy, and Japan.125  The duties of a protecting power were 
rooted in customary international law, but were first codified in the 1929 Geneva 
Conventions.  These duties included the establishment of a bureau of relief and 
information concerning POWs, representation of POWs and belligerent countries in 
disputes over the application of the Conventions, provision of counsel for POWs in 
military tribunals, and even the responsibility to ship reading materials to POWs.126  In 
World War II, some of the protecting power responsibilities were partly delegated to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), such as inspecting POW camps and 
maintaining a Central Agency for Prisoners of War that tracked each prisoner and 
facilitated correspondence.   
The ICRC, founded in 1863, depended entirely on Swiss neutrality to carry out its 
mandate.  The ICRC had a total of 2,500 employees in twenty-seven offices in 
Switzerland by the end of the war.127  The central ICRC committee was permanently 
fixed at a maximum of twenty-five Swiss citizens, and the president was normally a 
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former Swiss diplomat.128  The ICRC was independent of the Swiss government, but was 
heavily influenced by Swiss politics due to the crossover of leadership and the fact that it 
still depended on the Swiss government for over two-thirds of its regular income.129  
Thus, despite the independence of the ICRC in principle, the Swiss government could 
influence the actions of the committee, as it did in World War II to prevent an ICRC 
declaration against the Holocaust.130  The ICRC also collaborated closely with the Swiss 
government in the arena of influencing developing international law of armed conflict.131  
However, the ICRC mandate was broader than that of Switzerland, since the Swiss 
obligations as a neutral only apply during times of interstate war, whereas all of the 
ICRC’s humanitarian activities continue whether or not a conflict is in progress.132   
The ICRC’s humanitarian mandate made it an authority on the international law 
of armed conflict, including the law which protected internees of neutral countries.  
During World War II, concern over potential abuses of the law prompted the organization 
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to clarify the customary international of internment.  According to a retrospective ICRC 
analysis of World War II policies published in 1948, the ICRC’s position on treatment of 
military internees during the war was that “in the absence of definite treaty stipulations 
covering conditions of internment and treatment, the Committee always laid stress on the 
principle that conditions of internees in a neutral country should be at least equal to those 
in force for [POWs] in enemy hands.”133  However, the ICRC conceded that only Articles 
11 and 12 of the 1907 Hague Convention (V) as well as Article 77 of the 1929 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War directly applied to internees in 
neutral countries during World War II.134  These articles were silent on the exact 
administration of internment policies, and only enumerated the requirement to provide 
basic humanitarian protections.  Since the Hague Convention failed to “specify the 
system [governing administration of] military internees in neutral countries,” upon the 
outbreak of World War II the ICRC took the initiative to recommend “ad hoc measures in 
cases where conventional international law does not provide sufficient basis to assure 
victims of the war precise treatment in accordance with humanitarian principles.”135   
In circular letters of April 1940, addressed to all neutral powers in the conflict, the 
ICRC maintained that the provisions of the 1929 Convention should be the minimum 
protection for military internees.136  Under this interpretation internees would receive the 
same explicit minimum guarantees as POWs in the provision of internment locations, 
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housing conditions, food and clothing rations, sanitary amenities, and medical care.137  
The 1929 Convention also provided legal protections to POWs, stipulating that “escaped 
prisoners of war who are retaken before being able to rejoin their own army or to leave 
the territory occupied by the army which captured them shall be liable only to 
disciplinary punishment,” which by definition limited punishment for escape to a 
maximum of 30 days local arrest.138  The 1929 Convention further specified that 
“preventative arrest shall be reduced to the absolute minimum,” and “in no case may 
prisoners of war be transferred to penitentiary establishments (prisons, penitentiaries, 
convict prisons, etc.) there to undergo disciplinary punishment.”139  It is clear that 
affording Americans internees the rights of the 1929 Convention would have precluded 
their detention in Wauwilermoos for attempting escape and also limited the time of their 
detention.  The ICRC circular thus attempted to clarify the legal status of internees.  Not 
unlike an amicus brief to a court, such a circular had no real standing in law, but given its 
source it should certainly have influenced the neutral governments.  The history of 
internment was relatively short even by World War II, and so it could be argued that 
"customary" international law--the law as defined by commonly accepted practice--had 
not settled on a single solution.  The 1940 circular sought to fix custom and close 
loopholes in the written conventions, but could not carry the full weight of either. 
Nevertheless, in response to the circular the ICRC  “received assurances from 
most belligerent governments that the same 1929 Convention is also extended by analogy 
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to internees who are enemy civilians, as well as military internees in neutral countries.”140  
Neutrals such as Hungary and Romania accepted the ICRC interpretation of the 1929 
Convention without reservation.  The consulate general of Hungary informed Mr. Huber 
that tighter restrictions were applied to internees based on “mass escapes,” but despite 
this problem “the Hungarian Government is prepared to consider the provisions of this 
Convention as the treatment will benefit the Polish [internees].”141   
In a marked and even ironic contrast, the Swiss government, “whilst admitting 
that the stipulations of the Convention were by analogy applicable to internees,” also 
expressed the reservation that the disciplinary punishments in the Conventions were an 
insufficient deterrent to escape attempts.  The Swedish government expressed similar 
reservations in 1940, claiming that “it would not be fair to add to [neutral states’] 
problems by subjecting them to the extremely detailed provisions of the 1929 
Convention.”142   
As the legal recommendation of a universally recognized organization operating 
under international mandate, the ICRC circular opinions represented “soft law” that while 
not yet binding on states, reflected the emerging customary international law of the 
period.143  In the absence of codified treaty law, customary international law represents 
another type of “hard law” that “consists of the rules of law derived from the consistent 
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conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act in that way.”144  
As expressed by the ICRC, both “physical and verbal acts” can constitute state practice, 
such as “military manuals, national legislation, national case-law, instructions to armed 
and security forces, military communiques during war, diplomatic protests, opinions of 
official legal advisers, comments by governments on draft treaties, executive decisions 
and regulations, pleadings before international tribunals, statements in international fora, 
and government positions on resolutions adopted by international organizations.”145 
The legal position of the U.S. government over internment rights was the same as 
that of the ICRC, in that U.S. diplomats and their attorneys espoused the view, in the 
same phrase, that military internees enjoyed, “by analogy,” the full benefits of the 1929 
Conventions.146  In November 1944, General Legge reported to Leland Harrison, the 
minister of the U.S. Legation in Switzerland, that internees were held incommunicado in 
civilian prisons in violation of Article 56 of the 1929 Convention; possessions were 
confiscated in violation of Article 6; sentences to Camp Wauwilermoos were often six to 
seven months in violation of Article 54; Red Cross packages were refused in violation of 
Article 37; and conditions in Camp Wauwilermoos were “worse than in enemy prison 
camps according to reports in possession of American Interests.”147  General Legge also 
advised the U.S. War Department that strong action was necessary to make the Swiss “act 
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promptly” and he coordinated with Harrison to present the case to the Swiss Foreign 
Office.148  The U.S. complaints were presented by General Legge and Minister Harrison 
to high-level Swiss authorities: the Federal Commissioner of Internment and 
Hospitalization and the Minister of the Swiss Military Department.149   
The U.S. legation emphasized the two most widespread violations of international 
law in its complaints.  First, the incarceration of internees at Wauwilermoos for months 
or indefinite periods violated the 1929 Convention, which stated that “the duration of a 
single punishment may not exceed thirty days.”  General Legge believed that under the 
“by analogy” interpretation of the 1929 Convention, “internees certainly should not suffer 
worse punishment for [attempted escape] than prisoners of war.”150  Second, the 
deplorable conditions in the camp violated multiple provisions of the 1929 Convention, 
such as requirements that POWs “be lodged in buildings or in barracks affording all 
possible guarantees of hygiene and healthfulness” and receive food rations “equal in 
quantity and quality to that of troops at base camps [of the detaining Power].”151  Legge 
and Harrison could both attest to these conditions, as they had visited Wauwilermoos on 
November 3, 1944.152 
In concert with U.S. diplomatic efforts, their counterparts in the British legation in 
Bern protested the same mistreatment of British internees in Wauwilermoos.  Wing 
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Commander W.O. Jones, the assistant air attaché to the British Legation, wrote the Swiss 
Federal Commissioner of Internment and Hospitalization protesting the length of 
imprisonment, as well as the conditions.  Drawing from his own experience as a POW, 
Jones claimed that conditions at Wauwilermoos were “inferior to everything I saw during 
my 20 months of imprisonment in Italy,” and added “I am sure that the Swiss 
Government does not desire to subject the imprisoned British soldiers located on your 
territory to conditions worse than those existing, under this report, in the camps of 
prisoners in the countries of our enemies.” 153  In response, the Swiss Commissioner 
claimed that internees were simply under different regulations than POWs and therefore 
subject to penalties surpassing thirty days of confinement.154 
As a result of the diplomatic protests, U.S. and Swiss authorities met several times 
to address the accusations of noncompliance with international law.  General Legge 
visited Minister Karl Kobelt, the head of the Swiss Military Department, several times 
between mid-1944 and early 1945.155  However, the Swiss government never conceded 
the validity of the U.S. legal position.  After a meeting with Minister Kobelt in January 
1945, General Legge reported to the U.S. War Department that trials for internees who 
had attempted escape “will continue with punishment at discretion [of] Swiss Military 
Courts without reference by analogy to 30 day confinement of POW’s under [the 1929] 
Geneva Convention,” since “our internees are under Swiss law,” as opposed to the 
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protections of international treaties.  Legge had hoped to convince the Swiss that in view 
of the approaching end of the war, the Swiss “might consider shortening sentences.”156  
Warnings that the conditions of internment would “certainly be harmful to Swiss-
American relations when this entire matter comes into the light” greatly concerned Swiss 
officials such as the Federal Commissioner of Internment and Hospitalization.157   
In addition to the Allied protests, Swiss military and civilian observers also 
bombarded Swiss internment officials with concerns about the effects of internment 
policies.  In November 1944, Swiss Army Major W. Huber wrote the Federal 
Commissioner of Internment and Hospitalization worrying that “Switzerland is grossly 
violating the minimum guarantees of the Geneva Convention of 1929 on the treatment of 
prisoners of war” with respect to internees in Wauwilermoos.  Huber, an officer assigned 
to the Swiss Army Office of the Chief of the General Staff, complained that “it is 
incomprehensible why Switzerland gives its internees much harsher treatment than 
Germany's prisoners of war,” and believed that the length of confinement and lack of due 
process was “not just a violation of the Geneva Convention, but a violation of any law 
per se.” Huber claimed that conditions in Wauwilermoos had resulted in Americans 
losing “all respect for the Swiss Army and Switzerland,” and that the internees had 
“learned to hate the country and the Swiss.”  Huber stated that simply releasing the 
internees was not enough to restore Swiss credibility and repair the damage cause by the 
internment crisis.  Rather, he argued that the perception that the Swiss government and 
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Swiss Army were hostile to Americans must also “be rebutted by evidence that the 
reprehensible treatment of American detainees was not ordered by the responsible 
officers in Bern and did not represent the politics of the country and public opinion.”158  
The direct intervention of an outsider like Huber demonstrates that there were some in the 
Swiss Army who were concerned about how adherence to the spirit of international law 
would affect the legacy of Swiss neutrality beyond the end of the war. 
Another unsolicited voice in the debate over treatment of American internees was 
the Swiss press.  Despite wartime censorship of the Swiss media, various newspaper 
editors felt that it was their duty to report violations of neutrality to the government even 
if they lacked unfettered access to the public.  This was the case for Albert Adler, editor 
of The Wartime Observer, who personally visited Wauwilermoos on October 25, 1944 as 
a result of “persistent rumors spread in Davos that mentioned the penal camp 
Wauwilermoos . . . where appalling conditions prevail that would be no credit to our 
country.”159  After spending four hours at the camp, Adler confessed that “The results 
exceeded my worst expectations.”  He described crowded barracks surrounded by 
barbed-wire and mud, hygiene facilities “in the most primitive state,” and leadership 
which refused to distribute Red Cross aid parcels.160   
Looking beyond the problem of simply ensuring the confinement of internees, 
Adler saw the issue as one of ideology.  How could Switzerland, with its mandate to 
inspect compliance with international law in “just about every prison camp in the world,” 
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fail to uphold the same standards itself?  Adler’s conversations with interned Americans 
convinced him of the damaging effects of the internment policies.  Airmen who had 
previously espoused kinship with the Swiss had experienced a radical change of heart, 
such that “the Swiss people in general are not seen as neutral, but considered exactly the 
same as nationals of the enemy.”  The cause, he explained, was that “people do not 
consider an escape attempt as dishonorable,” and although escape attempts justified some 
manner of legal response, the punishment meted out at Wauwilermoos was “in no way 
proportional to the offense.”161   
Adler realized that the legacy of Swiss actions would affect Switzerland’s postwar 
position among the world powers, and predicted that “If this method of punishing the 
American internees is continued in the same way, then the worst consequences can be 
expected for our country.”  In his opinion, the current policy reflected “pure legalism” 
and certainly could be falsely justified “with a legal or bureaucratic sham,” but this 
symptomatic approach only addressed immediate diplomatic complaints.  Failure to 
rectify the underlying problems of Swiss military justice and the conditions in 
Wauwilermoos would result in the shift of public opinion against Switzerland, which 
Adler believed would cause “incalculable damage to our country.”  In his view, “The 
population would probably be very surprised if they knew what the American flying 
officers think about our country today and are willing to tell other [people] 
afterwards.”162 
Huber and Adler’s protests reveal that the Swiss attitude toward the application of 
international law to internees was hardly monolithic.  Rather, these individuals sought to 
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abrogate the government policies for both the sake of the internees themselves as well as 
the implications that legal recalcitrance posed for the Swiss national legacy.  This dispute 
can therefore shed light on the cultural values that were threatened by the FCIH policies.  
According to José Marina, “Law is a part of the regulatory system of a culture, which 
coercively imposes the compliance of certain rules and procedures to solve conflicts.”  
He believes that law was created to preserve a society’s “fundamental values” from social 
conflict, values such as peace, justice, survival, and public order that are necessary for 
coexistence.163  Perhaps the values that Huber and Adler sought to protect were in part 
the rule of international law and commitment to humanitarian principles, both important 
facets of Swiss exceptionalism.  The enforcement of questionable internment policies 
may have served the purpose of ensuring Swiss sovereignty by demonstrating strict 
neutrality and possibly averting German reprisals, but at what cost?  If Switzerland 
sacrificed the ideals that it stood for, then the price was too high for Huber and Adler. 
Huber and Adler’s resistance to the government’s administration of international 
law is also reminiscent of how culture can influence the law through the pursuit of 
cultural justice.  According to Andrew Ross, this type of contestation occurs when legal 
processes are “too mechanistic in their attention to procedural rules, and not sensitive 
enough to the cultural security and social aspirations of citizens.”164   
It is also important to note that individuals like Huber and Adler were resistant to 
both the Swiss government’s legal position over internment as well as the manner in 
which these laws were enacted.  The distinction is important because “disciplinary 
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policies and practices are shaped both by the structure in which they occur and the semi-
autonomous individuals who participate in them and who enact the policies.”165  The 
Swiss legal position enabled the conditions at Wauwilermoos by denying the protections 
of the Geneva Conventions that would have limited the length and type of punishments 
available to military tribunals.  However, the mistreatment in Wauwilermoos was not 
inevitable simply because internees were punished under the Swiss Military Penal Code.  
The fact that such a camp existed at all in conjunction with its inept leadership were also 
to blame, as both factors were preventable.  Finally, the Swiss military tribunals 
frequently sentenced American airmen to lengthy prison terms rather than the authorized 
reduction to disciplinary punishment.  Had any of these additional factors been mitigated, 
it is conceivable that Americans might not have suffered abuse despite the lack of explicit 
protections under international law.  In this scenario, the debate over international law 
would never have occurred.    
Complaints by the Allied governments and concerned Swiss citizens were 
insufficient to change underlying Swiss policy.  The Swiss rebuttal began with a different 
interpretation of international law.  The Swiss government argued that treating military 
internees as POWs was inconsistent with existing precedents and would itself amount to 
a violation of international law.  In contravention to the legal position outlined in earlier 
correspondence with the ICRC, the Swiss government maintained that the “by analogy” 
extension of POW protections to internees was “nowhere stipulated” in the 1929 
Convention.  Therefore, absent the protection of international law over escape attempts, 
internees would be “governed by the domestic law of the contracting parties.”  In this 
case the domestic law was the Swiss Military Penal Code, which permitted open-ended 
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punishments that the Swiss argued were “proportionate to the offence committed and the 
necessity of preventing re-occurrence.”166   
The Swiss also cited case law as a precedent for denying the protections of the 
1929 Convention to military internees.  After the internment of the Forty-fifth French 
Corps in 1940, Swiss military tribunals determined that internees could be punished more 
severely than POWs.167  The Chief Swiss Prosecutor expressed the view that Switzerland 
was obligated to use force against internees, including long-term imprisonment and 
criminal sanctions, or would “run the risk of being forced out of [its] neutral position.”168  
The Swiss claimed that failure to adequately punish U.S. internees for escape attempts 
could be regarded as a violation of their obligation to uphold the 1907 Hague 
Convention, and therefore incite Germany “to reprisals or even hostile measures” against 
Switzerland.169  
 This argument from law reflected real structural pressures. The Swiss position 
seemed dubious to the U.S. legation, but this policy had been in force well prior to the 
internment of the first American airmen in 1943, and reflected the immense burden that 
internment imposed on the Swiss government.  During the war, Switzerland provided 
safe haven for nearly 300,000 refugees, over 100,000 of whom were military refugees.  
One and a half divisions of the thinly-stretched Swiss Army were detailed to guard 
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military internees, representing an enormous logistical burden that also undermined 
defense against violations of Swiss neutrality.170  The considerable expenses of 
internment were also shouldered by Switzerland, with little likelihood of reimbursement 
in the case of internees whose countries were under occupation.171  In this light, harsher 
punishment of internees to enhance control likely seemed prudent to Swiss authorities, 
who were almost certainly overwhelmed by the many problems posed by internment.   
In some cases, Swiss officials simply could not conceptualize the need to treat 
internees with the protections of POWs.  General Dollfus was one such official who was 
well-insulated from the actual implementation of his policies as the FCIH commissioner.  
In rebutting claims that internees should receive the protections of the 1929 Geneva 
Convention, Dollfus explained that “as a layman, and using my common sense, I tell 
myself that the Swiss internees, the unguarded so to speak . . . cannot be compared to 
prisoners of war who risk their lives trying to escape.”  He made this distinction because 
he claimed the internees escaped from hotels, rather than the “barbed wire and machine 
guns” of a traditional POW camp where prisoners “risk their lives trying to escape.”  
Dollfus certainly knew that once caught escaping, subsequent escape attempts were from 
barbed-wire compounds like Wauwilermoos, where conditions were harsh and machine-
guns were fired at escapees.  Yet he was silent as to whether those in punishment camps 
were now deserving of POW protections by virtue of their surroundings.  If Dollfus 
believed his excuses, then he legitimately thought that the accusations about 
Wauwilermoos conditions were “completely untenable,” inferring that they were not in 
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fact comparable with Axis POW camps.172  This attitude can perhaps be explained by the 
mixed signals that Dollfus received about camp conditions, as well as his relative 
isolation from those who actually carried out the policies of the FCIH. 
Although the Swiss refused to modify their legal position, the internal and 
external pressures did have some effect, at least in that they took measures to inspect 
Wauwilermoos for proper conditions.  Inspection of the camp fell under the joint purview 
of the Swiss government and the ICRC, since both shared the duties of a protecting 
power.  While apparently well-intentioned, these inspections reveal the problems inherent 
in the requirement for a protecting power to police itself.  Both Switzerland and the ICRC 
used Swiss Army officers to inspect Wauwilermoos, resulting in reports that often 
praised Captain Béguin and gave the camp a clean bill of health.  Inspections for the 
Swiss government were performed by the FCIH.  Swiss Army Major Florian Imer, the 
Chief of Internment Legal Services for the Commissariat from 1941-1945, reported to his 
superior in 1942 that “complaints about the treatment of internees at Wauwilermoos are 
not justified and most exaggerated,” and professed that the rigors of a punishment camp 
were necessary to enforce discipline.  Imer had “an excellent impression of the camp 
leadership,” and singled out Béguin as “the man it takes to run a camp like this .”173  Even 
as late as July 1945, while investigating the conditions of Russian military internees at 
Wauwilermoos, Major Imer again adopted an apologetic stance toward Béguin, claiming 
that articles in the press “garbled” the facts and displayed a “tendentious intent.”  Imer 
also reported that some Russian internees told him that Wauwilermoos had “a spirit of 
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fairness and good fellowship…which was not always to be had in other camps.”  
Paradoxically, in the same report Imer cited several manslaughter investigations against 
Russian internees as well as a mutiny among the same group in February 1944, both of 
which seemed at odds with claims of “good fellowship.”174  
The ICRC inspections of Wauwilermoos, also conducted by a Swiss Army 
officer, were only slightly more critical.  According to the ICRC, Switzerland only 
granted “occasional” internal camp visitations by the Red Cross until April 1944, after 
which regular inspections were permitted.  The ICRC recorded 864 inspections of 
military internment camps in Switzerland from 1944 through the end of the war.175  
Wauwilermoos received only four ICRC inspections from 1944 to 1945, all performed by 
ICRC delegate and Swiss Army Colonel Auguste Rilliet.176  In his inspection in May 
1944, Rilliet described the camp as “surrounded by barbed wire,” “guarded by armed 
guards and assisted by a detachment of military dogs,” and having the capacity for four 
hundred internees.  Rilliet recorded only six Americans in the camp, and noted that the 
barracks of the English and American internees were “the least tended to.”  Rilliet found 
that most of the interned officers he questioned “do not know why they are kept here,” 
and cited the case of one Polish officer who already had been incarcerated for nine 
months without explanation.  However, Rilliet’s overall assessment was that “the 
discipline in the camp and the uniform order made a good impression.”177   
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Colonel Rilliet’s next inspection of Wauwilermoos in October 1944 documented 
the arrival of twenty American officers.  He noted that the internees who were awaiting 
military tribunals often spent longer in pretrial confinement at Wauwilermoos than the 
sentences they eventually received.  Colonel Rilliet quoted the commandant, Captain 
Béguin, who blamed the Swiss military courts for the plight of the military internees and 
called their situation “unfortunate.”  Béguin also told Rilliet that he was irritated by the 
fact that the soldiers sentenced to Wauwilermoos for attempted escape “receive the 
harshest punishments,” as if he believed that would-be escapees were being punished 
unnecessarily and unfairly.178  These sentiments seem dubious in light of Béguin’s 
disparaging comments about interned Americans in his private correspondence to the 
Commissioner of Internment and Hospitalization, particularly since the American 
internees almost certainly constituted the majority of would-be escapees in the camp at 
that particular time.179  Therefore, it is likely that Béguin made these comments simply to 
put his apologetic comments on the record, since he was the person most likely to be 
blamed for any misconduct at Wauwilermoos. 
Compromise 
Despite the failure of diplomacy to quickly remedy the incarceration of internees 
and the conditions at Wauwilermoos, the Swiss government eventually bowed to U.S. 
pressure and compromised.  The Swiss brokered a deal to release the majority of 
American internees in Wauwilermoos back to their regular camps on thirty day paroles in 
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mid-November 1944.180  This entailed written “promises” by the internees to refrain from 
further attempts to escape, countersigned by the U.S. Legation.  This placed both the 
internees and the U.S. government under a binding obligation to “respect the terms” of 
the paroles.  Thus, a breach of parole through escape was “an offense against the laws of 
war” and required the return of the internee in question.181  Granting the paroles 
facilitated the evacuation of eighty American internees, leaving five still confined at 
Wauwilermoos.  Of these five, one remained in Wauwilermoos because he refused to 
sign a parole, and the remaining four because they had already been sentenced by 
military tribunals.  General Legge considered this only a partial solution, negotiated in a 
“typically evasive manner” by the Swiss and “inexplicable” from a legal perspective.182   
Although the compromise released most American internees from 
Wauwilermoos, the paroles were only a temporary solution.  General Clayton L. Bissell, 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2) on the War Department General Staff, 
refused to authorize subsequent extension of the paroles, explaining that “further use of 
paroles only compromises the integrity of our position and is contrary to their obligations 
as members of US armed forces.”183  This position was consistent with U.S. policy at the 
time, which normally prohibited the authorization of paroles, but allowed them by 
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exception so long as they were obtained with the permission of a military superior.184  
General Legge described the Swiss as “actively antagonistic” in direct reaction to the 
U.S. refusal to grant further paroles.  American internees were not sent back to 
Wauwilermoos upon expiration of the paroles in mid-December 1944, but instead were 
confined to the “isolation” camps at Hünenburg, Greppen, and Diablerets until the 
majority of remaining internees were repatriated in mid-February 1945.185 
In an apparent reaction to American diplomatic pressure, the Swiss military 
tribunals also transitioned to punishments that were more proportional to the crime of 
attempted escape.  Although tribunals continued for American internees after the release 
of most Americans from Wauwilermoos in mid-November 1944, the sentences dropped 
considerably from the penalties assessed through late 1944.  When 1st Lt. James 
Mahaffey was convicted of multiple escape attempts and sentenced to 300 days 
imprisonment on December 5, 1944, the average American sentence for such “disregard 
of regulations” stood at 87 days.  However, after mid-January 1945 the average sentence 
dropped to only 48 days, not including at least a dozen escape cases that were reduced to 
disciplinary punishment in lieu of prison time.186   
The decision to downgrade escape charges to disciplinary punishment normally 
occurred in lieu of referral to a military tribunal.  However, in at least one case in April 
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1945 a judge downgraded charges that had already been referred to a tribunal.  On trial 
were Sgt. Joseph D’Atri and Sgt. James Stanley, who both escaped from their 
confinement camp at Les Diablerets and were arrested while trying to cross the French 
border on March 7, 1945.  According to a letter from the FCIH section chief, Colonel 
Probst, “the preventive detention suffered seems sufficient to offset the penalty incurred.”  
Probst may have also taken pity on D’Atri and Stanley because they were caught in a 
snowstorm prior to their arrest in March, and subsequently hid in a stable for three weeks 
while subsisting on scavenged food and rations from Red Cross parcels.  As a result, both 
internees explained to their arresting officer that “we have been very ill and were nearly 
dying.”  However, both men were already repatriated by the time the charges were 
dismissed, which raises doubts about the real motivation behind the decision.  As with 
over 100 other cases, when Americans were repatriated or successfully escaped their 
tribunals were halted because the Swiss Army could no longer enforce a verdict when the 
internee was out of their jurisdiction.  This fact in itself would be a normal justification to 
dismiss the charges.  Instead, the FCIH section chief emphasized that the hardship of the 
prior detention was punishment enough, reflecting a distinct shift from earlier hard-line 
views on enforcement of FCIH policies.187   
In February 1945, the Swiss Chief of Legal Services also announced a formal 
policy shift under which internees convicted of escape attempts would serve a maximum 
of 45 days imprisonment.188  A sentence of greater than 30 days was still excessive under 
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the U.S. interpretation of international law, but it nevertheless indicated the Swiss 
government’s desire to accommodate the U.S. position and bring their policies into 
conformance with the spirit if not the letter of the law.   
Other Influences over Internment 
The treatment of American internees was determined by a host of factors beyond 
mere quibbling over the exact meaning and application of international law.  Perhaps 
most importantly, at the same time that U.S. diplomats were protesting the mistreatment 
of U.S. internees, USAAF planes committed numerous and repeated violations of Swiss 
neutrality.  These violations, in the form of accidental bombings and territorial 
incursions, jeopardized the U.S. diplomatic position and likely prolonged resolution of 
the internment issues.   
On the afternoon of April 1, 1944, General Legge walked through the smoldering 
wreckage of the city of Schaffhausen, the capital of Switzerland’s northernmost canton 
on the border with Germany.  At the time the civilian death toll stood at 28 dead and over 
100 wounded, but the number of deaths would later climb to 40, including a national 
councilor.  Some of the buildings were still on fire, and the losses included 
Schaffhausen’s railway station, the city museum, several factories, and numerous 
houses.189  Earlier that morning, two waves of U.S. Army Air Force B-24 bombers had 
dropped their incendiary payloads on the city, under the mistaken belief that they were 
over Singen, a nearby German town with a strategic railway junction.  The bombing of 
Schaffhausen caused a significant diplomatic rift that undermined future relations 
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between the U.S. and Switzerland for the remainder of the war, in terms of both U.S. 
influence and financial indemnity.190   
 American diplomats sought to mitigate the fallout from the Schaffhausen incident 
by agreeing within a day of the bombing to immediate initial reparations of $1 million, 
with more funds forthcoming if necessary.191  U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and 
U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson offered formal apologies.192  Unfortunately, within 
days of the incident the U.S. Strategic Air Forces Command for the European Theater 
released a communication blaming the bombing on “unfavorable weather conditions,” 
which contradicted the testimony of Swiss observers in Schaffhausen who reported only 
light clouds.193  This provoked a storm of criticism in the Swiss press, such as statements 
that “The excuse of ‘bad weather’ is worthless,” and “Stick to the Truth, Please!”194  
These reactions prompted General Legge to recommend that the U.S. “accept full 
responsibility without seeking reasons to excuse.”  He recommended full settlement for 
the damages prior to a conclusive investigation, reminding the War Department that “our 
                                                 
190 See Jonathan E. Helmreich, “The Diplomacy of Apology: U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World 
War II,” Air University Review, May/June 1977, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, Halbrook, Target Switzerland, and 
Kreis, Switzerland and the Second World War. 
 
191 Telegram from the U.S. Secretary of State to the U.S. Minister in Switzerland, Number 1176, dated 6 
April 1944, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1944: Europe, Volume IV (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 795-6. 
 
192 Halbrook, Target Switzerland, 204. 
 
193 Memo from U.S. Military Attaché in Switzerland to U.S. War Department, Number 1285, dated 4 April 
1944, NARA, RG 319, E57.   
 
194 Telegram from the U.S. Minister in Switzerland to the U.S. Secretary of State, Number 2086, dated 4 
April 1944, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1944: Europe, Volume IV (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 793-4. 
 
      60 
prestige [is] at stake.”195  Similarly, Minister Harrison wrote the Secretary of State to 
express that the explanation of poor weather “has had an unfavorable reception,” and 
argued that the “attempt [by] headquarters to minimize severe misfortune and [the] 
distortion [of] facts must be energetically rejected.”196   
Legge and Harrison correctly understood that the Schaffhausen incident would 
significantly undermine their diplomatic leverage with the Swiss, who had already 
accused the Allied forces of bombing the town of Samaden in October 1943.  Since this 
was not the first Allied bombing of Switzerland, promises were made that new steps 
would be taken to avoid repeat incidents.  General Legge coordinated with the Chief of 
the Swiss Air Corps to clarify national boundaries on U.S. pilot maps, create a system of 
marking the border to make it visible from the air, as well as establish a fifty mile safety 
zone around the Swiss border in which no bombings should be attempted.197 
Had the bombing of Schaffhausen remained an isolated incident, it is likely that 
the U.S. Legation successfully would have quelled most of the resultant diplomatic 
rancor with apologies and reparations.  However, as the Allied air campaign expanded 
east, aerial violations of Swiss neutrality grew in frequency, establishing a “pattern of 
violation, apology, reparation, and new violation.”198  A particularly volatile set of 
incidents occurred in September 1944, beginning with an aerial dogfight between Swiss 
                                                 
195 Memo from U.S. Military Attaché in Switzerland to U.S. War Department, Number 1285, dated 4 April 
1944, NARA, RG 319, E57.   
 
196 Telegram from the U.S. Minister in Switzerland to the U.S. Secretary of State, Number 2086, dated 4 
April 1944, in United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic 
Papers, 1944: Europe, Volume IV (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 793-4. 
 
197 Memo from U.S. Military Attaché in Switzerland to U.S. War Department, Number 1315, dated 20 
April 1944, NARA, RG 319, E57.   
 
198 Helmreich, “The Diplomacy of Apology,” 24. 
 
      61 
and U.S. fighters on 5 September 1944.  The Swiss fighters were escorting two U.S. 
bombers to Dübendorf Airfield in Zurich when two U.S. Army Air Force P-51 Mustangs 
appeared and shot down both Swiss aircraft.  One Swiss pilot was killed, and the other 
was seriously injured in the incident.  Only days later on 8 September, U.S. P-51s again 
violated Swiss airspace and attacked the railway stations at Delémont and Moutier, 
destroying a locomotive and injuring four civilians.  On 9 September, a freight train was 
attacked at Rafz, injuring three Swiss civilians.  In addition, forty-two Allied violations of 
Swiss airspace near the city of Jura were reported.199   
The U.S. Legation in Switzerland had little influence over operational 
employment of U.S. bombers in England and North Africa, and therefore was unable to 
affect or limit violations of Swiss neutrality beyond sending suggestions to senior U.S. 
Army Air Force leadership and attempting to placate Swiss authorities.  As a result of the 
incidents in September 1944, General Legge sent descriptions of Swiss airplane markings 
to General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General of the USAAF, in the hope that this 
would aid U.S. pilots to differentiate between Swiss and German fighters.200  This was 
considered a contributing factor in misidentification of Swiss aircraft, since the Swiss Air 
Force possessed Messerschmitt Bf 109E fighters, which were manufactured and 
predominantly used in Germany.201  Legge also passed on details of Swiss efforts to 
avoid a repeat of aerial attacks, including the painting of Swiss crosses on fields and the 
roofs of houses along the border, flying observation balloons with Swiss colors, and even 
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Swiss Army Commander in Chief General Henri Guisan’s suggesting the attachment of 
Swiss military observers to a higher U.S. Army headquarters.202  However, senior U.S. 
commanders resisted such requests, and often tried to avoid responsibility for the 
bombings.  In November 1944, General Arnold suggested to U.S. intelligence officials 
that recent bombings of Switzerland might be the result of Germans flying captured U.S. 
bombers, an assertion deemed utterly absurd by intelligence officials on the ground in 
Switzerland.203   
The U.S. and Swiss efforts to curb accidental bombings were to no avail, as the 
cities of Basel and Zurich were bombed by B-24s of the U.S. Army Air Force on 4 March 
1945, killing five civilians.204  After this incident, U.S. Army chief of staff General 
George C. Marshall ordered a reluctant Lt. General Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the 
U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, to travel to Switzerland and apologize in person.205  
As a result of political pressure, the U.S. Army Air Force pilot and navigator who led the 
squadron that bombed Zurich were charged by courts-martial in May 1945, although both 
were eventually acquitted.206   By the end of the war, one estimate placed the number of 
Allied bombs dropped on Switzerland at nearly 5,000, a total of approximately 165 to 
185 tons.  Nearly 100 Swiss villages were hit, destroying about 150 buildings and 
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damaging thousands more.  In the course of the bombings eighty-four Swiss citizens were 
killed, and another 260 were wounded.207   
General Legge made it clear that these violations of Swiss neutrality hurt the 
ongoing U.S. diplomacy over interment issues and noted that the incidents placed him in 
a “difficult position,” particularly since he was trying to negotiate the repatriation of the 
interned airmen before the end of the war.  Legge complained to General Arnold in late 
November 1944 that yet another series of attacks needed to be explained and apologized 
for, and asked “shall responsibility be accepted with regret but without excuse?”  He also 
reminded Arnold that “attacks render our position and that of interned airmen more 
difficult.”208  Any American complaint over the Swiss application of international law 
governing internment could be rebutted by the fact that America was persistently 
violating the international law that guaranteed Swiss neutrality, perhaps a more serious 
charge when considering the deadly implications.      
American diplomacy in Switzerland was also heavily influenced by the value of 
the intelligence apparatus that the Allies established and maintained in the country.  In 
1942, the U.S. Legation in Switzerland was supplemented by agents of the newly 
organized Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a secret organization that specialized in 
espionage.209  Switzerland, described by the OSS as “the main European listening post of 
both the Allied and enemy war fronts,” was selected as the OSS’s base for European 
operations due to its “geographic position,” as well as for the legal and operational cover 
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that neutrality provided for espionage activities. Under the diplomatic cover of the 
Special Legal Assistant to the U.S. Minister, Allen W. Dulles was selected to head the 
OSS in Switzerland.210 
Through its base in Switzerland, the OSS coordinated with and assisted nearly 
every resistance movement in Europe, including those in France, Italy, Austria, Germany, 
and Poland.211  The personal connections that Dulles established with Swiss Intelligence 
also provided critical information, as the Swiss had contact with both the German and 
Italian intelligence services.212  OSS Switzerland provided early warning of the Axis 
rocket-bomb factory at Peenemunde, the movements of German warships, the scuttling of 
the French fleet at Toulon, and the capitulation of the German Army in Northern Italy.213  
The OSS also coordinated an “underground railway” network throughout Europe that 
assisted over 4,000 downed aviators to return to Allied lines, including many Swiss 
internees.214  This apparatus was critical to Allied operations in Europe and certainly 
influenced the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, since too much political pressure against 
Switzerland might jeopardize intelligence collection.   
On  November 3, 1944, Dulles informed his superiors that General Henri Guisan 
had personally expressed to him that the U.S. bombings of Switzerland were “seriously 
affecting [the] attitude [of the] Swiss people toward [the] USA.”  Dulles agreed with 
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Guisan, and stated “Personally I believe [the] situation created by [the] attacks makes it 
more difficult to get Swiss cooperation in our present task of penetrating Germany.”215  
The potential political fallout over Allied bombings of Switzerland in the fall of 1944 had 
so concerned the head of the OSS, Brigadier General William Donovan, that he 
personally asked General Arnold to approve the Swiss request to allow observers in a 
U.S. Army command in Europe.216  Thus competing interests influenced U.S. diplomatic 
decisions in Switzerland, only one of which was the welfare of interned American 
airmen.  
Swiss government policies during the first several years of the war were also 
heavily influenced by the threat of German invasion, a prospect that inspired widespread 
fear among the Swiss population.  In 1940, the German invasion of France spilled over 
the Swiss border, testing Switzerland’s policy of armed neutrality and resulting in the 
Swiss Air Force shooting down eleven Luftwaffe fighters.  An enraged Hilter responded 
by ordering a clandestine raid against Swiss airfields, but the operation was thwarted 
when Swiss authorities intercepted the German saboteurs and their explosives.  After the 
fall of France, Swiss intelligence learned that the Germans were formulating plans to 
invade Switzerland.  The attack did not come, despite detailed planning by the German 
Army.  This was attributed in part to the Swiss mobilization of 850,000 soldiers, nearly a 
quarter of its population, which ostensibly would resist in National Réduit strongholds in 
the Alps for years.217  Another factor was the German belief that an invasion would 
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prompt the Swiss to destroy the Saint Gotthard and Simplon rail tunnels that linked 
Germany to Italy, thus nullifying much of its strategic value in transporting German coal 
that was vital to the Italian war effort.218  Despite the fact that Switzerland was not 
invaded, it was still surrounded completely by the Axis from the summer of 1940 to the 
fall of 1944, a reality that arguably made economic accommodation with Germany 
inevitable.219   
Trade between neutrals and belligerents was permissible under international law 
during World War II.  However, the 1907 Hague Convention provided that any “measure 
of restriction or prohibition” of any such trade must be “impartially applied” to all of the 
warring parties.220  Although the Swiss initially sold weapons such as Oerlikon 
antiaircraft guns to France and Britain in 1939, the blockade after the fall of France 
forced an accommodation with Germany.221  The Allies put significant pressure on the 
Swiss to reduce exports of “objectionable items” to the Germans, such as “listing” and 
boycotting Swiss companies that collaborated with Germany, as well as freezing Swiss 
assets.222  According to the U.S. Secretary of State, the listing campaign of Swiss 
companies was the “most effective initial weapon in achieving new ceilings on Swiss 
exports of arms and machinery.”223  The Independent Commission of Experts (ICE), 
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formed by the Swiss Government in the late 1990s to produce an impartial record of 
Swiss wartime practices, concluded that export of war material to Germany did occur 
under the auspices of the Swiss Federal Government, and therefore “constitute a violation 
of neutrality.”224  However, the earlier exports to the Allied nations were equivalent 
violations.  It is also important to note that Switzerland, with a massive new influx of 
refugees, was short of food, and had no coal or fuel resources.225  Swiss economic 
cooperation with the Axis must be viewed in this light, as Switzerland lacked many of the 
basic commodities necessary for subsistence.  Complete encirclement by the axis left the 
nation with no viable alternatives.  According to the ICE, “doing business with the 
enemy” was justified by the need to “supply the population with food and purchasing 
power.”226 
Even in late 1944 and early 1945 when the end of the war was in sight, the Allies 
still believed that the type and quantity of Swiss exports to Germany were aiding the 
enemy.  In December 1944, U.S. Foreign Economic Administrator Leo Crowley, 
informed Secretary of State Joseph Grew that he was “greatly disturbed about the lack of 
progress in economic warfare negotiations with Switzerland,” and recommended 
“immediate measures” to force the Swiss “to terminate at once their aid to our 
enemies.”227  In response, Grew rejected Crowley’s suggestion and conveyed that “For 
political reasons and for reasons arising out of the benefits to us of Switzerland’s neutral 
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position and future potential usefulness in the economy of Europe it is inadvisable to 
place too great pressure upon the Swiss government at this time in order to attain pure 
economic warfare objectives.”228  Grew’s stance demonstrated that Washington afforded 
the Swiss special diplomatic considerations because Switzerland filled humanitarian 
mandates, among other services.  Former Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote in his 
memoirs: 
“Toward Switzerland . . . our policy differed somewhat from that which we 
practiced toward other neutrals.  We felt it essential, in presenting our demands and 
in exercising pressure to reduce Swiss exports of strategic manufactured goods to 
Germany, to avoid pushing Switzerland into a diplomatic rupture, or worse, with 
Germany.  This was the reason that Switzerland, representing us diplomatically in 
enemy countries, was our sole link with them.  We had to depend upon her 
representatives to ensure the welfare of American prisoners of war.”229 
 
Hull’s remarks were intended to explain the lack of ultimatums in U.S. economic 
pressure against Switzerland, but they contextualized the diplomatic negotiations between 
the U.S. and Swiss governments.  U.S. diplomats could not afford to present 
unconditional demands to their Swiss counterparts, whether the concern was economic 
accommodation with Germany or unfavorable treatment of U.S. internees.  
Postwar Consequences 
The issue of internment rights remained alive in post-war reconsiderations of 
international law.  The gaps in international law for military internees in World War II 
led directly to the explicit codification of full POW rights to military internees under 
Article 4.B (2) of the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
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Prisoners of War.230  The 1947 Conference of Government Experts for the Study of the 
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims convened to revise the 1929 Geneva 
Convention expanded the list of persons protected by the Convention to include military 
internees, among other categories of combatants, because these personnel “should 
normally have been considered as [POWs], but who suffered hardship through the fact 
that they were not explicitly named in the Convention.231  The Conference considered this 
protection a minimum standard of treatment, “as military internees would as a rule be 
better off in a neutral country than in enemy territory.”232  The drafters of earlier 
conventions simply never envisioned a scenario where a supposedly neutral country 
would treat internees worse than POWs, particularly a neutral protecting power charged 
with enforcing POW protection.  This explains why it took until the 1949 Convention to 
explicitly codify the requirement that military internees receive the same rights as POWs.  
Despite the Swiss government’s stance in 1944 that internees should not receive 
protection under the 1929 Convention, at the time of signature they made no reservations 
to the revised 1949 Convention that included protection for internees.233  The treatment of 
military internees in Switzerland was certainly not the only example that convinced the 
ICRC to recommend that internees be explicitly guaranteed POW rights in the 1949 
Convention.  After the Italian Army capitulated in 1943, Germany threatened to classify 
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captured Italian soldiers as “interned military personnel” with the specific intent of 
denying them the legal protections of POWs.  Only the intervention of the ICRC averted 
this threat.234 
Although it is arguable that the 1929 Geneva Convention intended full POW 
protections for internees, the ICRC nevertheless seemed to accept the position of the 
Swiss government until the revision of the Geneva Conventions at the end of the war.  An 
ICRC report prepared for the 1947 Conference of Government Experts determined that 
although “military internees and escaped [POWs] in neutral countries should enjoy the 
same treatment as [POWs],” the lack of this protection “did not, on the whole, give rise to 
difficulties during the war.”235  In the case of U.S. internees in Switzerland, the ICRC 
later judged that “only the disciplinary punishments for attempted escape were more 
severe” and that their overall treatment “was by no means less favourable than that laid 
down by the 1929 Conventions.”236  Based on the ICRC inspection reports, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the ICRC never received any alarming reports over 
conditions in camps such as Wauwilermoos.  It is likely that the ICRC was more 
concerned with its mandate to protect POWs held in belligerent countries, since they 
would ostensibly be the most apt to suffer abuse. 
In fairness, the Swiss government eventually did address misconduct at 
Wauwilermoos, although too late for U.S. internees in the camp.  On February 20, 1946, 
Captain Andre Béguin was charged by a court-martial of thirteen violations of the Swiss 
Military Penal Code, including the suppression of a prisoner’s complaint.  Although the 
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court acquitted Béguin of the suppression charge, he was found guilty of multiple 
offenses reminiscent of his past history of financial mismanagement.  Béguin was 
convicted of ten charges, including fraud, embezzlement, bribery, abuse of authority, 
forgery, and disobedience.237  According to a local newspaper, he had defrauded over 
15,000 Swiss Francs from 20 individuals, including officers, noncommissioned officers, 
physicians, the head of the military bar, and internees under his charge.  The newspaper 
called him a "humbug" and "bluffer" who “likes to live beyond his means.”238  The court 
sentenced Béguin to three and a half years in prison, stripped him of his rank, expelled 
him from the Swiss Army, and terminated his civil rights for a period of five years.239   
General Dollfus was relieved of his duties as the FCIH commissioner in 
November 1944, the day after the American internees were paroled from 
Wauwilermoos.240  Dollfus continued in his position as the Swiss Army adjutant general 
for the remainder of the war and was eventually promoted to Lieutenant General.241  The 
FCIH was realigned under the Swiss Federal Military Department and administered by 
Colonel René Probst until the FCIH was liquidated in December 1945.  He was 
apparently the de facto FCIH commissioner, as no official was formally appointed to this 
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position after Dollfus’ departure.242  Probst was tainted by another FCIH mishap in 1945, 
the so-called “internment commission scandal,” which saw an FCIH intermediary 
embezzle a half million Swiss francs from the federal treasury.  Minister Kobelt held 
Probst responsible, which elicited the bitter response by Probst that “we leave [wartime 
service] as defamed soldiers, vilified beyond our borders.”243  
American internees like Daniel Culler eventually returned to the United States 
wondering “why Switzerland, the headquarters of the International Red Cross, would not 
allow foreign military prisoners held in Swiss prisons to receive Red Cross food packages 
or to be visited by a Red Cross representative.”244  Although few American airmen in 
Switzerland likely suffered comparable physical and emotional trauma to what Culler 
experienced, many nevertheless developed the same doubts about the Swiss commitment 
to neutrality and humanitarian principles.  In 1995, the publication of Culler’s memoirs 
prompted a statement from Kaspar Villiger, the President of Switzerland.  Villiger 
expressed regret that Culler was sentenced to prison for an offense that “was not 
defamatory,” and told him that “you and your comrades deserve the gratitude of the 
Swiss people” for helping to defeat fascism in Europe.  However, he also invoked the 
same argument used to justify the internment policy during the war, informing Culler that 
his “sentence reflects the important pressure exercised by other countries on 
Switzerland… The Swiss authorities were afraid that a less severe attitude toward 
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attempts of interned military personnel to escape would be interpreted as preferential 
treatment by the other warring party.”245 
Conclusion 
 The Swiss refusal to afford interned American airmen equivalent rights as POWs 
under the 1929 Geneva Convention was a questionable decision under international law 
at the time.  Ironically, the Swiss followed this policy despite their extensive history of 
neutrality, association with the ICRC, and a position of moral authority that seemingly 
presented compelling incentives to adhere to the full spirit of international treaties 
governing prisoner treatment.  Yet a decision to fully rescind the contested internment 
policy may also have produced consequences, which put the Swiss government in an 
untenable position.  The government faced a choice between violating the spirit of the 
law and tarnishing Swiss neutrality, or following the spirit of the law and risking possible 
reprisals by the Nazis.   
Swiss and U.S. diplomats clearly operated in a complex web of competing 
interests, all of which were interrelated.  To claim that the Swiss legal policy over 
internment was pursued for its own sake and was divorced from exterior influences 
would be a mischaracterization, just as the U.S. response to this policy was also 
influenced by competing policy objectives.  In the early stages of the war the Swiss 
government faced the prospect of German invasion if it adopted a seemingly over-
benevolent stance toward the Allies, although one could argue that adjustment of Swiss 
internment policies was unlikely to disrupt this balance by 1944.  Political retribution for 
perceived negligence and resulting damages from the Allied Strategic Bombing 
Campaign was almost certainly a stronger influence, as the Swiss sought leverage to curb 
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accidental aerial attacks against Swiss targets.  Conversely, U.S. diplomats limited the 
pressure they applied to solve the internment crisis, even near the end of the war when 
Allied victory was considered imminent.  The U.S. diplomats feared using political 
ultimatums to enforce Swiss compliance with international law, being unwilling to risk 
sacrificing Switzerland's value as a communications hub, intelligence center, and 
protecting power for U.S. POWs in Europe. 
Until late 1944, the Swiss chose to interpret the gray area of unenumerated POW 
rights in a manner that justified their recalcitrant internment policies.  In doing so they 
tacitly enabled and condoned the resulting prisoner mistreatment.  Many officials in the 
Swiss government were well aware of the shortcomings of the military justice system, 
which disproportionately sentenced internees who attempted escape to lengthy periods in 
Wauwilermoos.  Their inaction seemed contrary to the Swiss commitment to 
humanitarian principles.  However, the response to the treatment of internees was not 
monolithic; some Swiss citizens and military officers correctly recognized that 
confinement which disregarded humanitarian principles flew in the face of the Swiss 
mandate to uphold international law.  Therefore, they contested the Swiss government’s 
legal interpretation of internee status, hoping to prevent damage to Switzerland’s standing 
as a guardian of humanitarian treaty law.  Yet the policy was only moderated after the 
long term political ramifications became evident, in a manner that ameliorated internment 
conditions but ceded no ground in the debate over the negotiation of international law.  
Most American internees were paroled from Wauwilermoos, but the camp continued to 
operate under the same commander until he was prosecuted after the war ended.   
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 The problems, politics, and consequences of Switzerland's internment policy 
remain relevant to contemporary armed conflict, even though internees of neutral 
countries are now explicitly guaranteed rights as POWs in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
Despite the changing face of warfare, in which combatants often lack clear labels such as 
“belligerent” or “internee,” or even clear mandates as combatants, the exploitation of 
gray areas in international law to deny prisoner rights still produces similar consequences 
today.  The increasing frequency of conflict involving nonstate actors has promoted a 
reliance on customary international law over treaty law governing actions in war, since 
most treaty law only covers conventional conflict between recognized states.  
Despite ICRC efforts to enumerate standards of state practice in an attempt to define 
customary international law over intra-state or non-international conflict, proving and 
enforcing customary law remains extremely difficult.246  The lack of enumeration of 
humanitarian law for this type of emerging armed conflict makes it much more prone to 
subjective interpretation, particularly since state practice is inherently a fluid and 
evolving standard.  As a result, the type of negotiation over international law that 
occurred in Switzerland during World War II is all the more likely to resurface during 
contemporary conflicts. 
After the attacks of  September 11, 2001, the U.S. government chose to deny 
Geneva Conventions protections for detainees at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere, 
claiming that terrorists did not fall under the treaties.  In doing so, as a minimum, it 
created "maneuver room" that allowed for the subsequent prisoner abuse perpetrated by 
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the military and the Central Intelligence Agency, and failed to internally police itself in 
the absence of impartial observers.247  This outcome demonstrates that the infinite 
possibilities of combat continue to produce legal loopholes, and states continue to exploit 
them into the present. 
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